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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On July 21, 2004, the trial court issued a Ruling granting summary judgment in favor
of the defendant and dismissing the complaint with prejudice. (Addendum at 1-30) On
August 24, 2004, the court entered a final Order and Judgment dismissing the case with
prejudice. (Record at 000977; hereinafter "Rec

") On September 16, 2004, plaintiffs

filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the Order and Judgment. (Rec 000982) This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs failed to raise a

triable issue of fact on their breach of fiduciary duty claim.
This legal ruling was made on a motion for summary judgment and is therefore
subject to de novo review. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433,438 (Utah 1996). Plaintiffs filed a
timely Notice of Appeal (Rec 000982), which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
II.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs failed to raise a

triable issue of fact on their intentional interference with prospective economic
relations claim.
This legal ruling was made on a motion for summary judgment and is therefore
subject to de novo review. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433,438 (Utah 1996). Plaintiffs filed a
timely Notice of Appeal (Rec 000982), which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

III.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs failed to raise a

triable issue of fact that defendant's actions caused plaintiffs' injuries.
This legal ruling was made on a motion for summary judgment and is therefore
subject to de novo review. Harline v. Barker,, 912 P.2d 433,438 (Utah 1996). Plaintiffs filed a
timely Notice of Appeal (Rec 000982), which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no statutory provisions of central importance to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
Nature Of The Case
Defendant Deseret Certified Development Company ("Deseref *) is a "public finance
specialist" that advertises that it works with clients "in assessing financial needs and in
selecting the most appropriate public sector finance programs." What Deseret specifically
does for clients is guide them through the Small Business Administration ("SBA") loan
process. Deseret provides this service for a "contingent fee" in the sense that clients pay
Deseret only if the clients get their SBA-backed loan.
Plaintiffs sought Deseret's assistance when they were unable to get conventional
financing for a proposed movie theater in Spanish Fork. With Deseret in their corner,
plaintiffs were able to secure the necessary SBA-backed financing to build and open their
movie theater. The plaintiffs were business novices at the time, and Deseref s assistance was
critical, both with respect to the financing issues, and also on a broad range of issues
concerning the creation and operation of a successful new business venture.
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Unfortunately, Deseret decided not only to assist in the creation of plaintiffs'
business, but also to assist in its destruction. Soon after plaintiffs' theater opened, while still
actively advising and representing plaintiffs, Deseret took on as a client a second group of
investors that sought to open a theater in nearby Payson (the "Payson Group"). Deseret
and the Payson Group knew that the area's population was insufficient to support two
theaters in such close proximity. They nonetheless decided to move forward because they
expected the newer Payson theater to drive plaintiffs' theater out of business and therefore
succeed.
Their prediction came true. Deseret secured SBA-backed financing for the Payson
Group's theater, and when it opened, revenues for plaintiffs' theater dropped precipitously
and never recovered. Plaintiffs eventually filed for bankruptcy, losing not only their
investment, but their life's savings as well.
There is, of course, no prohibition on one company attempting to drive another
company out of business. Capitalism is built on unrestricted competition between
businesses. There are, however, certain service providers such as attorneys, brokers,
accountants and agents that undertake to loyally represent the interests of their clients, and
as a result are held to a fiduciary obligation not to take actions contrary to their clients'
interests.
Plaintiffs contend that by virtue of the extensive advice and representation that
Deseret provided plaintiffs, Deseret took on fiduciary obligations and therefore could not
represent a second client with contrary interests. The trial court, however, concluded that
Deseret acted as a middleman arranging a transaction between plaintiffs and the SBA, and
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therefore should not be held to an obligation of loyalty to the plaintiffs. The trial court's
error was its attempt to sort this out on summary judgment. There is an extensive record of
a complex relationship between plaintiffs and Deseret, and the question of whether Deseret
acted as plaintiffs' agent and or fiduciary is a disputed issue of fact that should have been left
to a trial.
The trial court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of fact as to
causation. Plaintiffs' theory, in this regard, was quite simple. The evidence is undisputed
that the Payson theater would never have opened without SBA-backed financing, and the
evidence is also undisputed that only Deseret could secure SBA-backed financing for the
Payson theater. Finally, the evidence is undisputed that business at plaintiffs' theater
dropped dramatically and never recovered after the Payson theater opened. The trial court
thought this insufficient to prove causation because other factors might have caused that
drop, such as bad management by the plaintiffs or poor movie choices. In effect, the trial
court ruled that to raise an issue of fact on causation, plaintiffs had to eliminate all potential
alternative causes of the catastrophic drop in their business. This, however, is not the
burden on summary judgment. Plaintiffs were required to show admissible evidence that
defendants' conduct was a proximate cause of their injury, and the drastic and irreversible
drop in business following the Payson theater's debut more than satisfied that burden.
Judge Howard struggled with the question of whether this case should be resolved by
summary judgment. Deseret filed its first motion for summary judgment when the case was
before Judge Laycock, and the motion was denied in its entirety. The case was then
transferred to Judge Howard, and Deseret filed a second motion for summary judgment.
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Judge Howard denied this second motion for summary judgment and set the matter for trial.
In the course of pre-trial proceedings, however, Judge Howard began to have doubts about
the prior rulings and sua sponte vacated the prior summary judgment rulings and ordered the
matter reargued. After reargument, Judge Howard reversed the prior rulings and granted
summary judgment. Plaintiffs submit, with respect, that in so doing Judge Howard became a
fact finder, resolving disputed issues of fact that should have been resolved through trial.
Statement Of Facts
In reviewing the facts, it is useful to keep in mind the two related but analytically
distinct services plaintiffs contend they received as defendant's client. First, plaintiffs
contend Deseret acted as their agent, representing plaintiffs before the SBA. Applying for,
using and repaying an SBA-backed loan is a complex process in which the borrower has to
petition the SBA both for initial approval of the financing and later for any modifications
that need to be made. Plaintiffs contend that Deseret petitioned the SBA on their behalf,
making Deseret their agent for all matters before the SBA. Just like a lawyer making an
argument in court on behalf of a client, Deseret petitioned the SBA on plaintiffs' behalf
whenever necessary.
Second, plaintiffs contend that Deseret acted as a business advisor, consulting on all
aspects of plaintiffs' movie theater project. Just as lawyers, accountants or stockbrokers
provide advice to their clients in their respective areas of expertise, Deseret provided
plaintiffs the expertise it had developed from years of assisting in the creation of new
businesses in the Utah market.
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Although the "agent before the SBA" and "business advisor" roles are
interconnected and at times overlap, plaintiffs will show in the Argument section that they
support two separate bases for finding that Deseret owed plaintiffs a fiduciary obligation of
loyalty.
The start of plaintiffs* movie theater project and Deseret's offer of assistance
Plaintiff Jon Triesault, along with his wife Elizabeth, his friend Raymon Bori, and
Raymonds wife Stephanie, sought to open a movie theater in Spanish Fork. They later
formed two corporations, Imagination Theaters, Inc. and Imagination Theaters Holding,
LLC, which are also plaintiffs in this action. Mr. Triesault was the leader of the group.
While he had a background in the movie industry, he had had no prior experience starting,
operating or financing any kind of business. None of the four individual plaintiffs had any
prior experience with, or knowledge of, SBA loan programs. (Rec 000544)
*As with most new ventures, financing was the first order of business. Mr. Triesault
talked with several banks about obtaining a loan, but these efforts bore no fruit.
Conventional financing was simply not available. (Rec 000544) In the course of talking to
one of the banks about a conventional loan, Mr. Triesault met Mr. Vanchiere, a VicePresident of defendant Deseret Certified Development Company ('"Deseret"). Mr. Triesault
described their first meeting as follows:
Mr. Vanchiere came up to me and put his arm around me and said, I don't think
you're going to get anywhere with the bank. But I like your idea and I can help you

6

get an SBA loan. And I can also help you get a bank that would also partially fund
your project. (Triesault dep. 61)*•
After receiving further information from Mr. Triesault on his plans for the movie
theater, Mr. Vanchiere agreed to both be a consultant and advisor and to provide assistance
in getting SBA-backed financing:
(The theater] was my idea, but I had never done this before. I thought it was a good
idea. Bur Mr. Vanchiere was the consultant and the advisor who was the motivating
factor in saying, I believe in your idea. I can help you get this SBA loan. And I can
also help you find a first position lender that will give you money - you know,
another loan. I didn't know I needed two loans at this point He revealed all of that
to me and guided us. (Triesault dep. 71-72)
One particular area of expertise that Mr. Vanchiere brought to the table was his
knowledge of the Utah business community. Mr. Triesault had only Uved in Utah a few
years, but Mr. Vanchiere had extensive experience in starting local businesses:
(H|e told me first that he could really be of assistance to us as an advisor because of
his knowledge in this community. He knew I was fairly new here.
He knew a lot more than I did about the business climate here in Utah County.
And he told me - or lead me to believe that his opinion was very valuable.
(Triesault dep. 83-84)
Mr. Vanchiere made it clear that his advice would extend beyond the area of getting
SBA-backed financing:
Q. [Mr. Vanchiere] would help you get a loan. Anything else?
A. That he would advise us as to the business itself and what he thought of it and
what he thought about its viability. He would make suggestions to us. He would
guide us along. He would work with our attorney. He would come down and take
a look at it and he would follow along the development of the project. And we
could call him for advice along the way. He was our mentor. (Triesault dep. 101)

1

The transcripts of the depositions of Jon Triesault and Mike Vanchiere are part of the
record on appeal, but were not numbered by the clerk's office. They will therefore be cited
by referring direcdy to the pages of the deposition transcript.
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Plaintiffs relied heavily not only on Mr. Vanchiere's advice, but also his general
opinion that the project was viable:
Before meeting Mr. Vanchiere, the other plaintiffs in this matter and I had not
completely committed ourselves to the theater project. To make it work, I was
going to have to put my whole life-savings on the line. Mr. Vanchiere assured me
that the project was economically viable and would work. (Rec 000544)
Mr. Vanchiere proceeded to advise and consult with plaintiffs on every aspect of the
project, including the number of screens the theater should have (Triesault dep. 87-88), the
types of movies it should show (Triesault dep. 91), the kinds of decorations it should have
(Triesault dep. 91), what promotions and other ways there were to get the community
involved (Triesault dep 91), the corporate structure plaintiffs' should create (Rec 000542),
and even how to run the concession stands. (Triesault dep 92-93). Mr. Triesault described
this consulting as ^brainstorming" with Mr. Vanchiere where they would:
talk about how the theater would develop and what we would do with it and how
we could run it and how we could maximize our potential. (Triesault dep. 92)
One of Mr. Vanchiere's most important functions was getting plaintiffs SBA-backed
financing. Before moving on to the specifics of Mr. Vanchiere's role in this process,
however, it is useful to pause and describe how SBA-backed financing works.
The SBA's Section 504 loan program
Plaintiffs applied under the Section 504 loan program, which provides long term
permanent financing for small businesses. The financing typically involves a package with
three components: the borrower contributes 10%, a private bank loans 50% and a certified
development company loans the remaining 40%. The certified development company's loan
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loan is funded by debentures that are backed by a 100% SB A guarantee.2 The defendant in
this case is the certified development company.
The SBA guarantee is the key to the whole scheme. Section 504 loans are made to
businesses that are unable to qualify for private financing. 13 C.F.R. § 120.101. The private
lender contributes 50% of the financing, but with a senior lien on all the project's assets.
While the private lender would not provide full funding for the project, they will almost
always agree to provide 50% of the funding, secured by 100% of the assets. The remaining
40% is provided by a certified development company such as the defendant, which raises the
money by selling debentures. The sale of those debentures is a simple matter because the
SBA provides a 100% guarantee of their repayment. Thus, with the SBA guarantee in hand,
a financing package can be created for small businesses that would not otherwise qualify for
funding.
There is, not surprisingly, a complex application process involved in securing the
SBA's approval for a Section 504 loan. An applicant must show the SBA that it meets the
general eligibility requirements for SBA loans (13 C.F.R. § 120.100), that credit is not
available from any other source (13 C.F.R. § 120.101), that it is a kind of business eligible for
an SBA loan (13 C.F.R. § 120.110), that it plans to use the loan proceeds for eligible uses (13
C.F.R. § 120.120), that is meets the SBA's lending criteria (13 C.F.R. § 120.150), and that it
meets a host of additional requirements specific to 504 loans. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 120.880 —
120.923. A detailed application must be completed to show that all of the requirements have
been met. 13 C.F.R. § 120.191.
2

13. C.F.R. §120.801; http://www.sbaonline.sba.gov/financing/sbaloan/cdc504.html; Tide
V of the Small Business Investment Act, 15 U.S.C. 695 to 697f.
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Deseret's role in the SBA loan application process
The existence of these labyrinthine regulations should not be unexpected; one is, after
all, applying for financial backing from the federal government. Neither Mr. Triesault nor
any of the other plaintiffs had any prior knowledge of the SBA loan process. They placed
complete trust and confidence in Mr. Vanchiere to handle this for them and Mr. Vanchiere
accepted this role. (Rec 000544) Mr. Vanchiere agreed not only to guide plaintiffs through
the 504 process, but also to help secure the private lender that would provide the first 50%
of the financing. (Triesault dep. 71)
Mr. Vanchiere's offer to undertake the SBA application process on plaintiffs' behalf
was consistent with Deserefs public statements about the services it provides for customers.
Deserefs web site describes the company's role as follows:
The Deseret Certified Development Company staff members are public sector
finance specialists. They work with all types of businesses in assessing financial
needs and in selecting the most appropriate public sector finance programs.
(Rec 000306; emphasis added).
This statement touting Deseret's expertise is also consistent with the services such a
company is authorized to provide by federal regulation:
Services a CDC [certified development company] provides to small businesses.
(a) ... It must market the 504 program, package and process 504 loan
applications, and close and service 504 loans....

(b) A CDC may provide small businesses with financial and technical
assistance....
13 C.F.R. § 120.827 (emphasis added).
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These statements are also consistent with The Standard Industrial Code Title Deseret
selected for its filings with the Utah Department of Commerce. Deseret chose 6282, a code
that means Deseret has designated itself a "seller of investment advice." (Rec 000305)
The SBA considers many factors in deciding whether to grant a Section 504 loan,
including the "strength of the business," "projected cash flow," and the "potential for future
success." 13 C.F.R. § 120.150. The starting point for an SBA application, therefore, is the
development of a business plan, and Mr. Vanchiere worked closely with plaintiffs on the
preparation of this plan. (Rec 000271) Specifically, Mr. Triesault and Mr. Vanchiere
discussed the fact that 10,000 people per movie screen was a generally accepted number used
to determine the economic viability of rural movie theaters. Plaintiffs' proposed theater was
going to have eight screens. The targeted market was from southern Provo to south of
Nephi, an area that included approximately 80,000 people. Plaintiffs and Mr. Vanchiere
concluded, therefore, that the proposed theater had a sufficient population of potential
customers to support a successful motive theater. (Rec 000271)
Mr. Vanchiere also helped plaintiffs prepare a statement of the theater's projected
cash flow for the business plan by providing plaintiffs with the necessary formulas. (Rec
000270) Plaintiffs viewed Mr. Vanchiere as the expert in creating a business plan that would
pass muster under the SBA's criteria. (Rec 000268)
Once all the required materials had been collected, Mr. Vanchiere provided plaintiffs
with all of the necessary application documents and provided considerable assistance in
filling them out. Those documents included the loan applications, personal financial
statements, business plans and individual resumes. (Rec 000271)
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Mr. Vanchiere advised plaintiffs what to include in their personal loan applications,
personal financial statements and resumes. For instance, Mr. Vanchiere found out that Mr.
Triesault had rental properties in California worth approximately $1,000,000.00. Initially,
Mr. Triesault had not included those properties on any of the documents. Mr. Vanchiere
advised him to include the information regarding his California rental properties in the
applications and financial statements. (Rec 000271)
Throughout this process, Mr. Vanchiere continued to provide advice that went
beyond what was necessary for obtaining the SBA loan, encompassing general business
advice on how to make the project successful. For example, Mr. Vanchiere suggested to
plaintiffs that they needed to hire a manager to run the theater because they lacked the
necessary experience, and plaintiffs proceeded to hire a manager. (Rec 000270)
Deseret acts as plaintiffs* agent for all dealings with the SBA
Once the application was complete, it needed to be submitted to the SBA for
approval. First, however, Mr. Vanchiere and Deseret reviewed the application to decide if it
would likely meet the SBA's criteria. (Rec 000269) Once Desert decided the application
would likely be acceptable to the SBA, it was Deseret that submitted the application to the
SBA, not the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs did not know where or to what office the application
was submitted. (Rec 000269)
From this point forward, all communications with the SBA were handled for
plaintiffs by Deseret. To this day, plaintiffs have never had a single direct communication
with the SBA. (Rec 000269) When plaintiffs had to petition the SBA for approval of some
action they sought to take, Deseret would make that request for them. When the SBA
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would respond to such a petition, it would provide its response to Deseret, not plaintiffs.
(Rec 000268)
One example of this is the SBA's Authorization For Debenture Guarantee, which
was the SBA's preliminary approval of plaintiffs' application for SBA financing. The SBA
sent this document to Deseret, not plaintiffs. (Rec 000258) Furthermore, the Authorization
had to be signed by both Deseret and plaintiffs and returned to the SBA District Office.
(Rec 000250) Presumably, Deseret returned the signed Authorization because, as noted
earlier, plaintiffs had no direct communications with SBA.
Deseret takes plaintiffs from preliminary approval to loan closing
The SBA Authorization is a preliminary approval with many requirements to be
fulfilled before the SBA-backed loan can close. Mr. Vanchiere continued to act during this
phase as both plaintiffs expert business advisor and agent for all communications with the
SBA. Thus, for example, Mr. Vanchiere continued to help plaintiffs with the theater's
construction, which had to be completed before the SBA-backed financing could close. At
one point during the construction, plaintiffs were over budget. In a meeting in his office,
Mr. Vanchiere advised plaintiffs how to cut costs in order to stay under budget. He did this
by proposing to shrink the size of the theater and going over the construction costs item by
item. He continued to examine virtually every aspect of the costs of the theater's
construction until the construction was completed. (Rec 000269)
Plaintiffs' cost overruns eventually required an increase in their construction
financing. This needed to be approved by both the SBA and Stearns Bank. Stearns Bank
was the private lender that provided both the interim construction financing and later the
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50% private lender portion of the Section 504 loan. Deseret handled this entire matter for
the plaintiffs, communicating with both Stearns Bank and the SBA and successfully securing
the necessary modifications to the financing agreements. (Rec 000268)
Securing an SBA-backed loan is not a one-shot project. First, one must apply. Then,
after preliminary approval, one must meet all the conditions for final approval. After final
approval, one must continue to meet all of the SBA's requirements on an ongoing basis. Mr.
Triesault understood that Mr. Vanchiere would make sure that everything that needed to be
done with respect to the SBA financing was done, and that he would represent plaintiffs
before the SBA whenever necessary, until the loan was fully repaid. (Rec 000268)
The loan closing and Deseret's multiple roles
On or about May 27,1998, the SBA-backed financing closed. At the closing, Mr.
Vanchiere presented plaintiffs a huge stack of documents and told plaintiffs that, because
they trusted him, they did not need to read any of those documents. Plaintiffs agreed and
signed the documents without reviewing them. (Rec 000268)
At this point, Deseret took on an additional role, because it became, in a limited
sense, plaintiffs' lender. As is typically the case for 504 financing, there were two separate.
loans. One loan, for 50% of the total, was from Stearns Bank. The second loan, which is
the SBA-backed loan, is technically made by Deseret to the plaintiffs. We say "technically"
because, although there is a loan agreement between Deseret and plaintiffs, Deseret did not
provide a loan in the true sense of loaning its own funds. The money provided by the loan
came from a debenture sold as part of the SBA's debenture pools, and the Debenture was
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fully guaranteed by the SBA. Thus, Desert acted as a conduit in getting the debenture funds
to plaintiffs. As the Authorization explains:
The Small Business Administration (SBA) authorizes the guarantee of a Debenture
to be issued by [Deseret] to assist Borrower.... The proceeds of the Debenture
shall be used only toward financing the purchase [or lease] and/or improvement or
renovation by Borrower [of the Spanish Fork movie theater]. (Rec 000258)
Unlike a true Bank, therefore, Deseret did not loan out any of its own funds. Indeed,
the actual disbursement of the Debenture funds and the collection of plaintiffs' payments
were handled by Colson Services Corp., a New York servicing agent hired by the SBA. (Rec
000088,000210)
Deseret and Mr. Vanchiere continue advising plaintiffs and
acting as their agent after the SBA-backed financing closes
Plaintiffs' theater opened in Spanish Fork on November 26,1997, and the SBAbacked financing closed in May 1998. Even though Deseret nominally became plaintiffs'
lender after the loan closed, it continued to provide plaintiffs its advisory and agency
services. (Rec 000268) Mr. Vanchiere, in particular, continued his constant role as plaintiffs'
agent and business advisor.
To fulfill his advisory duties, Mr. Vanchiere visited plaintiffs' theater on the average
of two weekends per month and continued to advise Mr. Triesault and Mr. Bori on the
theater's operations. (Rec 000268) During these visits Mr. Vanchiere consulted with
plaintiffs on everything from what they should serve at the concessions stand to what
movies they should show. Thus, before plaintiffs made a critical switch from second-run
movies to first-run movies, they discussed the issue with Mr. Vanchiere. Mr. Vanchiere
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referred to plaintiffs as "special favorites" and told plaintiffs to call him if they had any
questions. (Rec 000267)
Mr. Vanchiere also continued to advise plaintiffs on financial matters. For example,
Mr. Vanchiere told plaintiffs they should never personally take any amount of money from
the theater until the theater became profitable, and he checked to see whether they took this
advice. (Rec 000267) In order to enable Mr. Vanchiere to provide this kind of advice,
plaintiffs continually gave Mr. Vanchiere confidential information about how their business
was doing. (Rec 000268)
Deseret also continued to act as plaintiffs' agent with the SB A. For example, in
August 1999, a neighboring property owner sought the right to use some of plaintiffs'
parking spaces for a planned grocery store. The neighbor offered to pay $15,000 and other
valuable consideration. Plaintiffs thought the deal made sense, but could not enter into such
a transaction without SBA approval. On August 10,1999, Deseret wrote a letter on
plaintiffs' behalf to the SBA seeking its approval. The approval was obtained the next day.
(Rec 000267)
Deseret's fees
Deseret's services did not come for free. Plaintiffs paid Deseret $14,553 for a
Processing Fee, and other miscellaneous fees of $9,681.50, (Rec 000092) for a total fee of
$24,234.50 for the services provided to plaintiffs
Deseret takes on a competitor as a client
Plaintiffs' theater, which opened in November of 1997, had some growing pains and
was initially not profitable. After approximately 9 months, plaintiffs, in consultation with
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Mr. Vanchiere, made the decision to switch from second run to first run films. (Triesault
Dep. 143). This decision had an immediate impact on their business, which soon began
showing a profit. By the end of 1999, plaintiffs' business had turned the corner and was
consistently turning a profit. (Rec 000538)
Right about the same time, however, Deseret was actively working on a possible
Section 504 loan package for a group of investors that sought to open a competing theater in
Payson (the 'Tayson Group"), which is about nine miles from Spanish Fork, and directly in
the target market area for plaintiffs' theater. (Rec 000267) Deseret and the Payson Group
put together a business plan that targeted the destruction of plaintiffs' theater. While
"destruction" may sound a bit dramatic, it is in feet precisely what occurred. Deseret knew
that the proposed Payson theater was in the market area that plaintiffs were counting on to
provide sufficient customers for their theater complex. (Rec 000267) The Payson Group's
business plan specifically discussed and acknowledged that the Payson Theater would
succeed only by taking substantial business from plaintiffs' theater and rendering that theater
"no longer feasible"

Thus, the Market Analysis for the Payson Group's theater stated:

At first glance it appears that there may not be sufficient demand or population
for the proposed theater; however, it should be noticed that a new project which is
superior to existing supply frequently takes away market share from the existing
supply — and in effect, makes the older projects no longer feasible, rather than
the newer project. In the case of the subject property, it will be the only theater in
this market with stadium seating and all THX sound system. Given this fact, it is
reasonable that the subject property will be able to attract more than its "fair share."
(Rec 000223; emphasis added)
The previously existing first-run screens that the above-quoted analysis concludes will
"no longer [be] feasible" include plaintiffs' theater. Thus, the Payson's Group's business
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plan, which was prepared with the assistance and approval of Deseret, was designed to take
market share from the plaintiffs' and make the plaintiffs' theater "no longer feasible/' Id
Deseret submitted an application to the SBA on behalf of the Payson Group that included
this business plan, and the SBA approved the proposed loan. (Rec 000228)
There are two critical facts about this that are undisputed. First, the Payson Group
could not have gotten funding from any source other than the SBA. In fact, it is a
requirement for a Section 504 loan that the borrower be unable to secure any other
financing. 13 C.F.R. § 120.101. Second, the only way to get a 504 loan in Utah at the time
was to hire Deseret. (Rec 000459) Therefore, the Payson Group's theater would never
have been possible without Deseret's assistance.
Deseret was also dishonest in its dealings with the SBA. As shown above, the
business plan submitted to the SBA on behalf of the Payson Group depended upon
depleting the customer base of plaintiffs' theater. The Payson Group's submission to the
SBA, however, never mentions plaintiffs' theater by name and never discloses that one of
the theaters that will "no longer [be] feasible" is funded by an SBA-guaranteed loan. (Rec
000235) The SBA was provided no information, therefore, revealing that it was being asked
to approve a loan to one entity that was intended to cause a default in an existing SBAbacked loan. Id Had the SBA known that, it surely would not have approved a loan to the
second theater group. Thus, only by deceiving the SBA was Deseret able to get the Payson
Group loan approved.
The motivation for this activity would not seem terribly obscure. Deseret received
approximately $24,000 in fees from plaintiffs' transaction (Rec 000092), and about $25,000**
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more in fees from the Payson Group transaction. (Rec 000227) When Mr. Vanchiere told
plaintiffs about the new Payson theater, he was apologetic and attempted to claim that he
had had no personal involvement in that loan. (Triesault dep. 147)
Plaintiffs* business is destroyed
The Payson Groups' theater opened in or about April 2000. By July, 2002, the
plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy.
The evidence linking the opening of the Payson Group's theater to the decline in
plaintiffs business is overwhelming. Plaintiffs' theater had begun to show a profit several
months before the Payson Theater opened. After that theater opened, plaintiffs' theater
never again made a profit. (Rec. 000538)
The financial figures show the devastating before-and-after effect. On a gross level,
for the 12 months prior to Payson theater's opening, plaintiffs' revenues were approximately
$2 million, but just $1.4 million for the 12 months after the new theater opened. (Rec
000538)
One key measure of a theater's success is the amount of concession dollars per
customer. From May 1998 to May 2002, plaintiffs' theater made average per capita
concession sales of $1.80. At that time, movie theater industry standards considered a movie
theater to be doing well if the theater made more than a $1.70 average per capita on
concession sales. This shows that plaintiffs theater was well managed and potentially a
successful operation, if attendance was sufficient. (Rec 000521)
The opening of the Payson Group's theater had a direct and devastating effect on
attendance. Comparing similar months, in May 1999 the attendance for plaintiffs' theater
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was 42,813; in May 2000 attendance was 21,141. In June 1999 attendance was 49,058, in
June 2000,18,856. In July 1999 attendance was 43,080, but in July 2000 attendance was
28,712. (Rec 000520)
For the year before the Payson Theater opened, plaintiffs' attendance was
approximately 336,722 (Rec 000570), and revenues from concession sales were
approximately $606,099.60. (Rec 000569) For the year after the Payson Theaters opened,
attendance was approximately 231,717, and revenues from concession sales dropped to
approximately $417,090.60. (Rec 000569)
The Star Wars Episodes show with precision just how badly the opening of the
Payson theater hurt plaintiffs' business. In May 1999, Star Wars Episode I came out and the
theater had an attendance of 13,520 and $55,115.29 in admissions in the first week of the
movie. In May 2002, Star Wars Episode II came out and the theater had an attendance of
only 6,734 and just $26,188.71 in admissions in the movie's first week. (Rec 000569)
In the aggregate, in the year after the Payson Theaters opened, plaintiffs lost over
100,000 customers, over $600,000 in gross revenues and over $189,000 in gross concession
sales. (Rec 000569)
As a result of the bankruptcy, plaintiffs have lost the entirety of the $1.5 million
personal investment in this business. In addition, the SBA is demanding payment from each
of the four individual plaintiffs pursuant to their personal guarantees of the balance of the
$1,000,000.00 loan. (Rec 000741)
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The Trial Court Proceedings
Plaintiffs' complaint contains four claims. Count I alleges breach of fiduciary duty,
Count II tortious interference with prospective economic relations, and Count III alleges
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. (Rec 000005) The complaint also alleges a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Rec 000001)
Deseret initially moved for summary judgment on Counts I, II and III, arguing that
the undisputed facts showed that plaintiffs could not sustain those claims. The case was
before Judge Laycock at the time, and she denied defendant's motion in its entirety. (Rec
0000320).
The case was then transferred to Judge Howard. Deseret prompdy filed a second
motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no evidence that defendant's conduct
had caused plaintiffs' injuries, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. At the conclusion of the hearing on this
motion, Judge Howard denied the motion as to causation, but granted it as to the emotional
distress claim. (Rec 0000620) Before an order was entered, however, plaintiffs moved to
reconsider the dismissal of the emotional distress claim. (Rec 0000651) On May 5, 2004,
Judge Howard issued a ruling granting plaintiffs' Motion To Reconsider and upholding the
emotional distress claim. (Rec 0000741) Consequendy, on May 18, 2004, Judge Howard
entered an order denying defendant's Second Summary Judgment Motion in its entirety. Rec
0000888)
A trial date was set and the parties proceeded to prepare the matter for trial. In the
middle of the pre-trial proceedings, however, Judge Howard expressed concern over the
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previous rulings on the summary judgment motions. No new evidence or legal argument
had been presented; his concern apparently arose from giving the matter more thought in
the course of conducting pre-trial proceedings. As a result, Judge Howard struck not only
his own ruling on defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, but also Judge
Laycock's ruling on defendant's first Motion for Summary Judgment. Judge Howard also
cancelled the trial date and set a time for "re-argument" of the two summary judgment
motions. After hearing argument, Judge Howard issued a Ruling on July 21, 2004, that
granted defendant's motions for summary judgment in their entirety. Judge Howard ruled
that there was no evidence to support any of the claims, and furthermore, even if there was
evidence to support liability, there was no evidence showing causation. (Add 28) A final
Judgment and Order was entered on August 24,2004, and this appeal followed.
Plaintiffs appeal the entry of summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty and
tortious interference claims (Count I and II). Plaintiffs do not appeal the dismissal of the
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing claim (Count III).
The trial court did not separately discuss the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim in its final ruling, except to state, "the Court dismisses Plaintiffs' Complaint
with prejudice and all respective causes of action along with the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims Plaintiffs attached to each cause of action." (Add 29) The
emotional distress claim was therefore dismissed because in the court's view its viability
depended upon the existence of a vahd claim of unlawful conduct under Counts I, II or III.
There will, therefore, be no separate discussion of the emotional distress in this brief, but it
clearly should be reinstated if Counts I or II are reinstated as a result of this appeal.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Count I - Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Plaintiffs allege that Deseret was a fiduciary
because it was plaintiffs' agent in presenting matters to the SBA, and also because it was an
expert business advisor in which plaintiffs placed great trust and confidence. The trial court
rejected both of these bases for plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim because it found
that: (1) although the defendant acted as plaintiffs' "voice before the SBA," the plaintiff did
not "control" the defendant and thus defendant was not plaintiffs' agent, and (2) there was
no evidence that plaintiffs placed the requisite trust and confidence in the defendant so as to
create a fiduciary duty. Both of these issues, however, should not have been resolved on a
motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs and the defendant had a long and close
relationship, and there is ample evidence that defendant was, in fact, plaintiffs' agent, and
also a trusted expert business advisor. A trial is required to determine the precise
relationship between the parties.
Count II — Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Relations:
Plaintiffs allege that defendant's assistance to the competing theater in Payson intentionally
interfered with its prospective relations with its customers. The trial court acknowledged
that there are facts showing intentional interference, but ruled, as a matter of law, that the
defendant did not use improper means, which is an element of the tortious interference
claim. This was error because there was ample evidence that the defendant deceived the
SBA into granting the loan to the competing theater, which it would not otherwise have
done had it known the full facts, and defendant's actions constituted a conflict of interest,
which violates the federally mandated standard of behavior for those assisting businesses in
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the SBA loan process. These facts create triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant
used "improper means," and thus summary judgment should have been denied
Causation: The trial court ruled there was no evidence that defendant's conduct in
arranging financing for the competing theater was the cause of the demise of plaintiffs'
business. However, the evidence shows that plaintiffs' theater suffered an immediate and
irreversible decline immediately after the Payson theater opened, and that the Payson Group
could not have gotten financing without Deseret's assistance. That evidence, alone, raised a
triable issue of fact as to whether Deseret's conduct caused plaintiffs' injuries.
ARGUMENT
All of the trial court's rulings were made on motions for summary judgment. When
considering the record, therefore, this Court must consider the "facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Carrier v.
Salt Lake County, 2004 WL 2659178 (Utah 2004).
I.

Count I; Breach Of Fiduciary Duty
There are two types of fiduciary relationships under Utah Law, one created by

contractual relationships, and the other implied in law:
It has, however, been noted that there are generally two types of fiduciary
relationships:
(1) [T]hose specifically created by contract such as principal and agent, attorney and
client, and trustee and cestui que trust, for example, and those created by formal legal
proceedings such as guardian and/or conservator and ward, and executor or
administrator of an estate, among others, and (2) [T]hose implied in law due to the
factual situation surrounding the involved transactions and the relationship of the
parties to each other and to the questioned transactions.
First Sec. Bank ofUtabN^L. v. Banbeny Development, 786 P.2d 1326,1332 (Utah 1990)
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Plaintiffs contend that Deseret acted as both types of fiduciary. First, plaintiffs assert
that Deseret was a contractual fiduciary because it agreed to act as plaintiffs' agent for all
matters before SBA. Thus, for example, when plaintiffs needed approval from the SBA for
some action they wanted to take, Deseret would be the one to contact the SBA, make the
presentation, and secure the necessary approval. If Deseret was indeed plaintiffs' agent, it
owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiffs as a matter of law.
Second, plaintiffs contend that Deseret was a fiduciary implied in law because it acted
as plaintiffs' expert business advisor. Fiduciary duties arise when one party places a
particular trust and confidence in another (Id. at 1333), and plaintiffs will show that by
agreeing to act as plaintiffs' expert business advisor, plaintiffs justifiably reposed special trust
and confidence in Deseret, thereby creating a fiduciary relationship.
A.

Deseret Was Plaintiffs* Agent For All Matters Concerning The SBA.

The trial court ruled that, as a matter of law, Deseret did not act as plaintiffs' agent.
The court found that plaintiffs "authorized Defendant to act on their behalf in obtaining an
SBA loan" and that "Defendant... was their voice with the SBA" (Add at 6), but that
Deseret was not an agent because it was not subject to plaintiffs' "control." There is a
contradiction on the face of this conclusion. If Deseret was "plaintiffs' voice with the SBA,"
then Deseret must have been subject to plaintiffs' control. To be someone's "voice" means
Deseret was stating to the SBA what plaintiffs wanted in the way of an SBA loan, which
necessarily means it was under plaintiffs' control. See, e.g., Christean v. Industrial Comm'n., 196
P.2d 502, 511 (Utah 1948) (an agent is "employed to represent another in contractual
negotiations or similar transactions"). For this and many other reasons, plaintiffs will show
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that there is ample evidence that Deseret acted as plaintiffs' agent, and the question of the
existence of an agency relationship should not have been resolved on a motion for summary
judgment.
Before examining the merits of this issue, there is one important bit of history.
Deseret's initial summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary claim admitted'Deseret

was

plaintiffs' agent:
[Deseret's] representation of Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs' limited agent for the purpose of
securing the SBA Loan ended once the Authorization was obtained. Thereafter,
[Deseret] owed a duty not to the Plaintiffs, but to the SBA, as SBA's limited agent
for the purpose of closing and servicing the SBA Loan. (Rec 000106)
Deseret thus admitted it was plaintiffs' agent, arguing only that the agency
relationship — and with it the fiduciary duty - terminated when the initial SBA authorization
was received. Later, Deseret tried to ease away from this admission, arguing without much
elaboration that it was not "plaintiffs' agent in the sense argued by Plaintiffs." (Rec 000154)
At no point, however, did Deseret ever argue that it was not subject to plaintiffs' control, as
the trial court found. The trial court based its summary judgment conclusion, therefore, on
a position never taken by Deseret.
Now to the merits of the trial court's conclusion on the absence of "control." There
is no question but that control is an element of agency. An agent is one who undertakes to
act on someone's behalf subject to that person's control. Restatement (Second) of Agency §1
(1958); Mecham v. Consolidated Oil & Transportation, Inc., 53 P.3d 479, 483 (Utah App. 2002).
What, then, does the evidence show on this issue?
The first instance in which Deseret represented the plaintiffs before the SBA was the
submission of plaintiffs' Section 504 loan application. (Rec 000541) Although there is no
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copy of plaintiffs' application in the record,3 we know from the Authorization that was
received that plaintiffs applied for $1 million loan for a movie theater in Spanish Fork.
Furthermore, plaintiffs Jon and Elizabeth Triesault and Raymon and Stephanie Bori
personally guaranteed the loan. (Rec 000087))
The question is who "controlled" Deseret's actions when tendering plaintiffs' loan
application to the SBA, and the answer must be the plaintiffs. Deseret had no authority to
submit an application unless plaintiffs told them to. Deseret had no authority to decide how
much financing to seek, or whether the funds would be used for a movie theater or a
restaurant, unless plaintiffs told them to do so. Deseret had no authority to decide who
would personally guarantee the loan, nor the myriad of other particulars of the loan sought
by plaintiffs, unless plaintiffs told them what to do.
Mr. Vanchiere was certainly consulted on every aspect of the loan application and his
advice was crucial in deciding how to present the proposal to the SBA. But relying on
someone's advice does not mean that the person is not under your "control." Mr. Vanchiere
could advise, suggest, influence or cajole, but he ultimately had to present the application
that plaintiffs wanted. Mr. Vanchiere could even refuse to present an application for
plaintiffs, but there is no basis for concluding that Mr. Vanchiere was not ultimately subject
to the control of his client, the plaintiffs, when tendering that application to the SBA.

3

The fact that neither party thought the application relevant to the summary judgment
motions reflects the degree to which the trial court's analysis varied from what the parties
focused on.
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Mr. Triesault's testimony repeatedly reflects that fact that, while plaintiffs always
sought Mr. Vanchiere's input, and while they discussed nearly everything with him, plaintiffs
made the ultimate decisions on the nature of their project:
Kind of seating: "In our particular case we decided on going with auditorium
seating with an additional slope." (Triesault dep. 77)
Number of screens: "Q. ... Did he recommend it or did he just validate what you
suggested [as to the number of screens]?"
"A. I've forgotten whether he validated or suggested. There were conversations
concerning many aspects of the physical plant and the operation itself. He offered
quite a few ideas and suggestions about the theater as we were developing. I never
separated them out." (Triesault dep. 88)
Type of movies: "I had the idea of a family values theater, but we took it further
after talking with Mr. Vanchiere. We did additional things to make it family
friendly." (Triesault dep. 91)
Equipment: "I ran all kinds of - just about everything past Mr. Vanchiere just to
get his read of it And sometimes he would have an opinion on something and
sometimes he wouldn't." (Triesault dep. 117)
Getting additional funds: "Q. What did you understand the consequences of a
glitch of needing more money to be potentially with respect to the SBA
authorization.
"A. I knew that Mike was gong to have to go and ask for an authorization to get
more." (Triesault dep. 127).
Mr. Triesault eventually summed up the role Mr. Vanchiere played:
"My impression was that Mike Vanchiere was acting as our advocate to see that we
had a business project that could stand on its own and the he would help us through
the 504 loan process. That he acted as our mentor and as our loan arranger and
guide in this process." (Triesault dep. 135)
This testimony shows that plaintiffs, although heavily dependent on Mr. Vanchiere's
expertise and advice, were seeking financing for their business project. Plaintiffs ultimately
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decided what kind of business they wanted to be in. Deseret was under plaintiffs' control
because what it agreed to do was get SBA approval for the project plaintiffs chose.
After plaintiffs received the authorization from the SBA, the terms of the financing
had to be modified because of cost overruns. Consequently, on December 5,1997, Deseret
wrote a letter to the SBA asking for certain modifications to the terms of the financing. (Rec
000081) Deseret likely advised plaintiffs that SBA approval was needed, and how to go
about getting that SBA approval. When writing to the SBA, however, Deseret was doing
what plaintiffs wanted by getting the SBA approval plaintiffs needed because of cost
overruns.
These facts, plaintiffs submit, would seem to show that it is undisputed that Deseret
was under plaintiffs' control. The question presented by this appeal, however, is only
whether there is enough evidence to raise a triable issue of fact that Deseret was acting as
plaintiffs' agent. When the facts are viewed in the light most favorably to plaintiffs, there is
clearly evidence that Deseret was under plaintiffs' control, and thus the question of whether
Deseret was plaintiffs' agent should not have been resolved through summary judgment.
The trial court confused plaintiffs' reliance on Deseret's expert advice with the ability
to control what Deseret presented to the SBA. Thus, the trial court noted "Defendant
directed Plaintiffs on how to conduct their business." (Add. at 7) The testimony quoted
above, however, shows only that plaintiffs relied on defendant's advice and expertise, and
this does not preclude the element of control. The perfect illustration of this is the lawyerclient relationship. Clients typically rely heavily on their lawyer's advice, but lawyers have
always been held to be the agents of their clients, because a lawyer ultimately can only seek
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what the client wants and is therefore subject to the client's control. Ditty v. Checkrite, IJd,
Inc., 973 F.Supp. 1320,1334 (D.Utah 1997).
In the realm of agency law, Deseret is considered an independent contractor that is
an agent. Deseret was an independent contractor because plaintiffs did not control its
physical conduct,4 but it was an agent because its task was to represent its clients. The
Restatement points out that this is a very common arrangement:
In fact, most of the person known as agents, that is, brokers, factors, attorneys,
collection agencies, and selling agencies are independent contractors as the term is
used in the Restatement of this Subject, since they are contractors, but, although
employed to perform services, are not subject to the control or right of control of
the principal with respect to their physical conduct in the performance of the
services. However, they fall with the category of agents. They are fiduciaries; they
owe to the principal the basic obligations of agency: loyalty and obedience.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14N, comment a (1958).
The trial court concluded that Deseret acted as a "middleman" because it represented
plaintiffs before the SBA for its own purposes — to foster economic growth. The fact that
Deseret has an underlying goal of fostering economic growth in Utah, however, does not
undermine the fact that when it communicated with the SBA on plaintiffs' specific loan, it
was doing what plaintiffs wanted it to do.
The narrow question presented by this appeal is whether Deseret's status as an agent
can be decided as a matter of law, rather than at a trial. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the
evidence discussed above would permit a fact finder to conclude that in communicating with

4

When a principal controls the physical conduct of an agent, there is a master servant
relationship, the most common example of which is the employer/employee relationship.
Domett v. Dowsett, 207 P.2d 809, 811 (Utah 1949). An agent not subject to physical control
by the principal is an independent contractor. Id
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the SBA Deseret was acting as plaintiffs' agent, and therefore the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to Deseret under this theory.
B.

The Impact Of The SBA's Regulations
And Standard Operating Procedures.

The trial court initially noted that the SBA's regulations were not controlling because
this is a common law claim. If Deseret acted as an agent, federal regulations cannot undo
that, and if Deseret did not act as an agent, federal regulations cannot make them an agent.
The trial court nonetheless noted that it found some support in an internal SBA operating
procedure. Although these matters are marginally relevant, we note that the trial court erred
in its reading of the SBA's regulations and operating procedures.
There are two relevant pronouncements. First, an SBA regulation defines an "agent"
as follows (13 C.F.R. § 103.1):
(a) ... an authorized representative, including an attorney, accountant, consultant,
packager, lender service provider, or any other person representing an applicant or
participant by conducing business with SBA.
(b) The term conduct business with SBA means:
(1) Preparing or submitting on behalf of an applicant an application for financial
assistance of any kind....
Deseret is an "agent" under this definition because it has never denied that it
"submitted" an application for financial assistance to the SBA on behalf of plaintiffs.
Indeed, Mr. Vanchiere admitted in his deposition that Deseret was an agent under the
definition in this federal regulation. (Vanchiere Dep. 32)
In addition to the above-quoted Regulation, which is part of an extensive set of
official regulations governing the SBA loan programs, the SBA has issued an internal manual

31

of standard operating procedures. That manual contains a statement that under the Section
504 loan program, certified development companies such as Deseret are not "agents." SOP10(4) Subpart A, chapter 6. This raises the question of how to reconcile the Regulation
quoted above with the statement in this standard operating procedure. Plaintiffs submit that
the reconciliation can be found in the multiple roles played by certified development
companies under a Section 504 loan. In addition to acting as the applicant's agent and
advisor, unlike other SBA programs, in a Section 504 loan the certified development
company also loans money to the applicant. When providing the loan, certified
development companies are not acting as agents. That, however, does not negate that fact
that if they choose to provide assistance to applicants in preparing and presenting their
applications to the SBA, certified development companies also act as agents for the
borrowers. The standard operating procedure, therefore, is not suggesting that certified
development companies never act as agents in connection with 504 loans, but only that they
are not agents when loaning money to applicants.
In the final analysis, the Regulation and the standard operating procedure are not
determinative of the factual question of whether Deseret acted as an agent. Furthermore, as
the above analysis shows, they would appear to create more confusion than clarity.
Nonetheless, to the extent they have some value, the pronouncement most directly relevant
is the federal Regulation that provides that those who prepare or submit applications on
behalf of potential borrowers are considered agents, and that is precisely what Deseret did
for the plaintiffs.
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C.

Deseret's Fiduciary Duty Precluded
Providing Assistance To The Payson Group.

The trial court held, in the alternative, that if Deseret was plaintiffs' agent, its
fiduciary duty was not broad enough to preclude providing assistance to the Payson Group.
This issue should have been decided at a trial.
The trial court began in the correct place, by noting that an agent owes a fiduciary
duty only with respect to matters within the scope of its agency. Restatement (Second) Of
-Agency §13 (1958). The alleged breach here, however, related to a matter direcdy within the
scope of the agency. The scope of Deseret's agency was obtaining SBA-backed financing to
fund plaintiffs' movie theater. The breach was providing assistance to a competing venture
that caused the very venture that was the subject of the agency to fail. Deseret's actions with
respect to the Payson Group caused plaintiffs to default on the very loan Deseret, acting as
an agent, had secured. It is hard to imagine a much closer connection between an agent's
actions and the scope of the agency.
One of the specific prohibitions on an agent is working for a competitor:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty not to act or to agree to act
during the period of his agency for persons whose interests conflict with those of
the principal in matters in which the agent is employed.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 394 (1958). Deseret's work with the Payson Group plainly
violated this prohibition on an agent's conduct. See a/so, Prince, Yeates & Geld^ahler v. Young,
94 P.3d 179,184 (Utah 2004) ("an agent is subject to a duty not to compete with the
principal concerning the subject matter of his agency").
The trial court relied on the fact that Deseret loaned money to plaintiffs, and from
this concluded that it could not be a fiduciary. The court found support for this from the
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"fact" that should plaintiffs default on the loan, Deseret would have to sue plaintiffs. The
trial court's logic is flawed because Deseret can and did wear multiple hats. While it is true
Deseret loaned money to plaintiffs — which is not a fiduciary act — Deseret continued to act
as an agent and expert advisor and thus continued in its fiduciary role. Many courts have
held that banks can be both lenders and fiduciaries. For example, in Mancuso v. United Bank
of Pueblo, 818 P.2d 732, 738 (Colo. 1991), the court reversed a grant of summary judgment in
favor of a bank on this very issue:
When a bank moves into the role of an advisor, the resulting relationship extends
beyond the relationship of debtor and creditor and may give rise to higher duties.
A Florida court reached the same conclusion in Capital Bank v. MVB Co., 644 So.2d
515, 519 (HaJVpp. 1994):
Generally, the relationship between a bank and its borrower is that of creditor to
debtor, in which parties engage in arms-lengtfi transactions, and the bank owes no
fiduciary responsibilities, [citations omitted] However,... [i]n BarnettBank of West
Florida v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d at 923, the Florida Supreme Court found that a fiduciary
relationship arose between a lender and a customer from the parties' established
relationship of trust and confidence.
Accord, Security Pacific National Bank v. Williams, 262 CaLRptr. 260,278 (CtApp. 1989) ("while
there exists no per se fiduciary relationship between a bank and its customers, a fiduciary
duty may nevertheless arise from their business relationship when the customer reposes trust
in a bank and relies on the bank for financial advice or under other special circumstances/");
Deist v. Wachhofy 678 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1984) ("modern banking practices involve a highly
complicated structure of credit and other complexities which often thrust a bank into the
role of an advisor, thereby creating a relationship of trust and confidence which may result in
a fiduciary duty upon the bank"); Tokar^ v. Frontier Federal Savings and Loan Assoc, 656 P.2d
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1089 (Wash.App. 1983); Steelvest, Inc. v. ScansteelService Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991)
("The bank may have breached this fiduciary relationship by agreeing to lend money to
Scanlan to help him form Scansteel with the knowledge that such formation could have an
adverse effect on Steelvest").
Numerous courts, therefore, have held that banks can undertake roles that create
fiduciary obligations. These holdings apply a fortiori to the facts of this case because Deseret
was not a true bank. As noted in the Statement of Facts, Deseret loaned none of its own
money. It acted as a conduit channeling the money from the Debenture to the plaintiffs.
(Rec 000094) From an economic standpoint, therefore, there never was a true
debtor/creditor relationship between Deseret and plaintiffs.5 Indeed, the trial court erred
when it held that if plaintiffs defaulted on the loan, Deseret would have to sue them.
Plaintiffs have defaulted, and the SBA has sued them, not Deseret.6 The reason for this is
that Deseret lost no money when plaintiffs defaulted because the loan was funded by the
Debenture, and the repayment of the Debenture was guaranteed by the SBA. It is the SBA,
therefore, that has suffered a loss.
To conclude, the question of whether Deserefs assistance to the Payson Group
constituted a breach of its fiduciary duty presents a question of fact for a trial.

5

At the loan closing, Deseret assigned the Note from plaintiffs to the SBA (Rec 000162),
and plaintiffs' loan payments were made to Colson Services Corp., a servicing agent retained
by the SBA. (Rec 000088, 000210) This further shows that Deseret was never truly in a
debtor/creditor relationship with plaintiffs.
6
The United States of America, through its Agency, The Small Business Administration, v. Raymon Bori,
Stephanie Bori, Jon L. Triesault, and Elizabeth A. Triesault, United States District Court, District
of Utah, Central Division, Case No. 2:03CV446DB. The court can take judicial notice of
this under Utah Rule of Evidence 201(b).
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D.

Deseret Became A Fiduciary Because Mr. Vanchiere
Undertook To Act As Plaintiffs* Expert Business Advisor.

A fiduciary relationship can arise due to the specific facts of a relationship.
Furthermore, whether such a relationship exists is "generally a question of fact." Von Hake
v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985).
It is not easy to define when such fiduciary relationships arise. The most thorough
discussion of the subject is found in First Security Band of Utah N*A. v. Banberry Development
Corp., 786 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1990), where the Utah Supreme court made the following
observations:
A fiduciary relationship imparts a position of peculiar confidence placed by one
individual in another. A fiduciary is a person with a duty to act primarily for the
benefit of another. A fiduciary is in a position to have and exercise and does have
and exercise influence over another. A fiduciary relationship implies a condition of
superiority of one of the parties over the other. Generally, in a fiduciary
relationship, the property, interest or authority of the other is placed in the charge
of the fiduciary, [footnote omitted]
A confidential relationship may similarly arise whenever a continuous trust is
reposed by one party in the skill and integrity of another. Also, as one court noted
in 1910,
There is no invariable rule which determines the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, but it is manifest in all the decisions that there must be not
only confidence of the one in the other, but there must exist a certain
inequality, dependence, weakness of age, of mental strength, business
intelligence, knowledge of the facts involved, or other conditions, giving to
one advantage over the other.
Plaintiffs' evidence raises a triable issue of fact that Mr. Vanchiere's conduct created a
fiduciary relationship with plaintiffs. As discussed in the Statement of Facts, Mr. Vanchiere
offered to be an advisor to plaintiffs in ways far beyond the financing issues. (Rec 000301304) Mr. Triesault was new to the Utah area, and Mr. Vanchiere touted his extensive
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experience in assisting start up business in the Utah area. As a result, Mr. Vanchiere was
consulted on every phase of the operations, and his advice was central to plaintiffs7
operations. (Rec 000301-306)
Financing was certainly a key to the success of plaintiffs' project, and here, Mr.
Vanchiere went beyond mere advice. He told plaintiffs they could entrust him to take all of
the steps necessary to get them the financing they needed for their project. (Rec 000300)
Indeed, Deseret advertises that it is a "public finance specialist." (Rec 000306)
The trial court concluded that all of the facts concerning the relationship did not add
up to a fiduciary relationship. With respect, the trial court could reach this conclusion only
by weighing the facts and coming to its own conclusion. There is sufficient evidence to
support a claim that plaintiffs placed enormous trust and confidence in defendant, and
defendant accepted and even encouraged them to do that Whether this rose to the level of
a fiduciary relationship must be decided after a full airing at trial of the facts concerning this
complex relationship.
E.

The Trial Court Relied On A Non-Existent Public Policy.

The trial court held that a "strong" public policy disfavors imposing a fiduciary duty
on lenders because it would dampen competition. (Add 16) In reaching this conclusion, the
court talked broadly about the chilling effect on "lenders" such a duty might have. This
misses the essential thrust of the SBA loan program.
Private banks are free to simultaneously lend to direct competitors. Furthermore,
there is no need for a "policy" favoring this because if a bank does nothing more than lend
money, it does not owe a fiduciary duty. Nothing in plaintiffs' claims would preclude private
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banks from loaning money to competitors. It should be noted, however, that common
sense will prevent a bank from doing what Deseret did here. What bank would loan money
to one company, only to turn around and loan money to a competitor that will drive the first
customer into default? The only reason this was able to happen here is because Deseret had
none of its own money at stake and the SBA fully guaranteed the repayment of the
Debenture. Thus, unlike a private lender, Deseret had no incentive to refuse to accept the
Payson Group as a client even though it would cause a default under the plaintiffs' loan.
This points to the difference between private loans and SBA loans that in turn reveals
a very different policy concern. SBA loans are intended to nurture small businesses that
might not otherwise have an opportunity to exist:
It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel,
assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns....
15 U.S.C § 631. By providing this assistance, the SBA furthers the overall health of the
American economy because "security and well-being cannot be realized unless the actual and
potential capacity of small business is encouraged and developed/' Id
While some of the small businesses sponsored by the federal government will fail on
their own, the function of the SBA loan program is to "aid, counsel, assist, and protect"
small businesses. The loan to the Payson Group, while it assisted one small business,
destroyed another. This is clearly inconsistent with the underlying policy of the SBA loan
program. There is no policy served by blindly loaning to every small business that comes
along, even when a loan to one small business destroys another SBA-backed small business.
The true policy concern underlying this case is that the SBA loan program is designed
to launch successful small businesses by "aiding" and "protecting" those businesses it
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chooses to sponsor. Viewed in this light, placing the fiduciary obligation of loyalty on
companies such as Deseret is not only consistent with the SBA's purpose, it is all but
required to insure that the program meets its goal. No purpose is served by allowing
Deseret to provide assistance to one dient, but then take on another client that attempts to
destroy its first dient. Deseret should be required to treat its clients with the same loyalty
that brokers, lawyers, accountants and all other expert advisors treat their clients. In this
way, the SBA loan program will not blindly launch as many small business as possible, but
will rather insure that those businesses it launches have the greatest chance of success.
II.

Count II: Intentional Interference With Prospective Economic Relations
The three elements of a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic

rdations are set forth in"LeighFurniture and Carpet Co. v. ISOMy 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah
1982):
in order to recover damages, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant
intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations,
(2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the
plaintiff.
The essence of the plaintiffs' intentional interference daim is that Deseret's actions in
promoting the Payson Group's theater interfered with plaintiffs' existing and potential
economic relations with its movie patrons. The claim further alleges that this was
intentional, because the business plan for the Payson Group's theater intended to succeed by
luring away plaintiffs' customers.
The trial court found the second and third dements - improper means and causation
— lacking. We will discuss the causation dement, which the trial court found lacking for all
of plaintiffs' claims, in Section III below. We focus here, therefore, on the second dement,
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which is whether Deseret used "improper means" in interfering with plaintiffs' economic
relations with it customers.7
In Leigh Furniture and Carpet Company v. ISOM, 657 R2d 293, 308 (Utah 1982), the
Utah Supreme Court held that the improper means test was satisfied "where the means used
to interfere with a party's economic relations are contrary to law...." The court further
explained as follows:
"Commonly included among improper means are violence, threats or other
intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation,
defamation, or disparaging falsehood." [citation omitted] Means may also be
improper or wrongful because they violate "an established standard of a trade
or profession."
Id. Plaintiffs have highlighted two sections in this quotation because the evidence shows
that Deseret engaged in both: (1) deceit or misrepresentation, and (2) the violation of an
established standard of a trade or profession.
A*

Deseret's Misrepresentations Or Deceit

As shown in the Statement of Facts, the Payson Group's business plan depended
upon taking significant numbers of plaintiffs' customers and making plaintiffs' theater "no
longer feasible." In blunt terms, the Payson Group's business plan was dependent upon the
destruction of plaintiffs' business. (Rec 000297)
This raises the interesting question of why the SBA approved the Payson Group loan.
The SBA guaranteed plaintiffs' loan and the SBA takes the most exposed position in such a
transaction. The private bank takes the first layer of the 504 loan and receives the primary

7

The second element of the tortious interference claim can be fulfilled by showing either
"improper motive" or "improper means." heigh Furniture and Carpet Company\ 657 P.2d at
304. Plaintiffs' claim is based solely on a showing of "improper means."
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mortgage. The certified development company takes the second layer loan, funded by the
sale of debentures, and the SBA guarantees those debentures. Thus, if the business fails, the
SBA will have the pay its guarantees on the debentures, and it will have the lowest priority in
the assets of the company. If a borrower defaults on a Section 504 loan, therefore, it will be
the SBA that suffers the loss.
Why, then, did the SBA approve the second loan, which made the failure of the
plaintiffs' loan almost a certainty? The answer is that the SBA never knew the Payson loan
was going to cause the failure of plaintiffs' loan because Deseret never told the SBA. The
business plan submitted to the SBA by Deseret and the Payson Group contains an appraisal
that refers to taking customers from existing first-run screens in the area. (Rec 000514) The
business plan never points out, however, that the referenced first run screens include one
that is funded by an SBA-backed loan. Id Deseret therefore secured approval of the Payson
Group loan by deceiving the SBA.
The trial court acknowledged that the appraisal fails to inform the SBA that the
Payson Group loan would destroy plaintiffs' ability to repay their loan. (Add 19) The trial
court thought this insufficient to show deceit because the appraisal does not necessarily
mean that the SBA was actually unaware of the relationship between the two loans. In
effect, the trial court decided that showing that the SBA was given a deceptive document
does not prove deception, because the SBA may have gotten the missing information about
the relationship between the two loans from some other source.
The trial court's reasoning was flawed. A jury would be permitted to infer from the
appraisal alone that the SBA was deceived. The appraisal was the most logical place to
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discuss the relationship between the two SBA-backed projects, because it specifically
identifies the need to make other theaters "no longer feasible" in order for the Payson
theater to succeed. Yet, it leaves out the critical fact that the theater that will "no longer be
feasible" is an SBA-backed project This, alone, would permit a jury to conclude that it was
more likely than not that the SBA was deceived. It is sufficient to show that the SBA was
given a deceptive document without ruling out every other possible source of the truth.
This is particularly true where, as here, Deseret was in the best position of all to
demonstrate that the SBA was told the truth, had that actually happened. Just as with the
plaintiffs, Deseret represented the Payson Group before the SBA and was therefore the
SBA's source of information on the Payson Group's project. Thus, if the SBA had been
told about the relationship between the two projects, the information would have come
from Deseret

Deseret, therefore could have stepped forward and provided evidence, if it

had existed, that it told the SBA about the relationship between the projects. Tellingly,
Deseret has never done so. Indeed, the jury would be permitted to infer from Deseret's
silence that the SBA was never told about the relationship between the two projects. Gerard
v. Young 432 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1967) (unfavorable inference drawn based on the failure to
produce witness or evidence within party's control).
The appraisal, therefore, is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact that the SBA was
deceived. That, alone, demonstrates improper means and fulfils the second of the three
elements of a tortious interference claim.
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B.

Violation Of An Established Standard Of A Trade Or Profession

Plaintiffs contend as an alternative basis for their tortious interference claim that
Deseret violated an established standard of its trade.8 Desetet is a certified development
company, and the "standards" for this entity are set forth in the following federal regulation,
which refers to such companies by the abbreviation "CDCf'
Lenders, Intermediaries, CDCs, and Associate Development companies
("ADCs") (in this section, collectively referred to as "Participants"), must act
ethically and exhibit good character.... The following are examples of such
unethical behavior. A Participant may not:
(b) Have a real or apparent conflict of interest with a small business with
which it is dealing....
13 C.F.R. § 120.140(b).
The trial court agreed that this regulation sets the standard of conduct for Deseret,
but ruled that Deseret's actions in aiding the Payson Group at the time it was still involved
with plaintiffs' loan did not constitute a "real or apparent conflict of interest." With respect,
if what Deseret did was not a conflict of interest, there will never be a conflict of interest. A
"conflict of interest" means the certified development company undertakes to act in a way
that conflicts with the interests of a current client. Deseret clearly did that, or certainly there
are facts sufficient to create a triable issue of fact on this question.
The trial court reasoned that it would be bad public policy to limit the activities of
certified development companies by applying the conflict of interest provision to this case,
so the trial court decided this cannot be a conflict of interest. This harkens back to the error
we discussed earlier. The SBA's program is designed to foster successful businesses, and
8

It is well settled that violating the standards of a trade or profession constitutes "improper
means." U.RC, Inc. v. R.0^4. General, Inc., 990 P.2d 945, 957 (Utah App. 1999).
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public policy does and should preclude certified development companies from taking on one
client, only to then take on a second client that destroys the business of the first client. If
one views the role of the certified development company as developing successful small
business, the regulatory conflict of interest provision makes eminent sense.
In plaintiffs' view, Deseret's actions should be deemed a conflict of interest as a
matter of law. However, at a minimum, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Deseret
had a conflict of interest, and thereby used "improper means" by violating an industry or
professional standard as set by the federal government.
III.

The Evidence Presented A Triable Issue Of Fact On Causation
The trial court ruled that plaintiffs lacked any admissible evidence that Deseret's

assistance to the Payson Group caused plaintiffs' harm. There is, however, abundant
evidence that (a) the opening of the Payson theater caused plaintiffs' theater to fail, and (b)
that the Payson theater could never have opened without Deseret's assistance. This
evidence was more than sufficient to create a triable issue of fact on causation.
A.

There Is Abundant Evidence That The Opening Of The
Payson Theater Caused The Demise Of Plaintiffs' Theater.

The evidence on this point was not only sufficient, it was overwhelming:
•

Comparing before and after revenues, for the 12 months prior to Payson

theater's opening, plaintiffs' revenues were approximately $2 million, but just $1.4 million for
the 12 months after the new theater opened. (Rec 000520)
•

Comparing attendance for comparable months before and after, in May 1999

the attendance at plaintiffs' theater was 42,813, in May 2000 attendance was 21,141. In June
1999 attendance was 49,058, in June 2000,18,856. In July 1999 attendance was 43,080, but
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in July 2000 attendance was 28,712. (Rec 000520) For the entire year before the Payson
theater opened plaintiffs' attendance was approximately 336,722 (Rec 000520), but only
231,717 in the year after.
•

Concession revenues, a key measure of a theater's success, were approximately

$606,099.60 before the Payson theater opened (Rec 000520}, but only $417,090.60 in the
following year. (Rec 000520)
•

In response to the suggestion that plaintiffs' theater just had bad luck with the

movies it picked after the Payson theater opened, consider the Star Wars data. In May 1999,
Star Wars Episode I came out. Plaintiffs' theater had 13,520 customers and made
$55,115.29 admissions in the first week of the movie. In post-Payson May 2002, Star Wars
Episode II came out and plaintiffs' theater had just 6,734 customers and made only
$26,188.71 in admissions in the first week of the movie. (Rec 000519-520)
•

In the aggregate, in the year after the Payson theater opened, plaintiffs' theater

lost over 100,000 people in attendance, over $600,000 in gross revenues and over $189,000
in gross concession sales. (Rec 000520)
The trial court ruled that all of this might have been due to bad management, market
factors or general economic conditions. (Add 28) This suggests, however, that plaintiffs
have to rule out every other possible cause of their post-Payson theater decline in order to
raise a triable issue of fact. This ovets^tps the burden on plaintiffs. The evidence cited
above is more than sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.
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The trial court also ruled that plaintiffs needed an expert witness on causation
because this issue was "not within the common knowledge and expertise of the layman."
(Add 26) There is no legal basis for imposing such a requirement
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
(emphasis added) There is nothing in this or any other rule of evidence that requires that
expert testimony be used.
Utah courts have developed a very limited exception to this in malpractice cases:
[B]efore the plaintiff can prevail in a medical malpractice action, he must establish
both the standard of care required of the defendant as a practicing physician in the
community and the defendants failure to employ that standard. In the majority of
medical malpractice cases the plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to establish
this standard of care. Expert testimony is required because the nature of the
profession removes the particularities of its practice from the knowledge and
understanding of the average citizen.
Nixdotfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351-52 (Utah 1980.)
There are exceptions to this rule even in malpractice cases. Id. (No expert testimony
needed to prove loss of a needle during surgery was negligent.) More critically, however, this
rule has never been extended outside the malpractice arena to create other categories of
cases where expert testimony is required. Indeed, in the only case cited by the trial court,
Shreiterv. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570, 574 (Utah App. 1994), the question was whether
the plaintiff had to present expert testimony on the standard of care owed by the operator of
a retiree apartment building who had failed to install a sprinkler system. Although the court
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noted that expert testimony is sometimes needed "where the average person has little
understanding of the duties owed by particular trades or professions, as in cases involving
medical doctors, architects, and engineers," the court concluded that expert testimony was
not required in that case because juries could determine what was reasonable for the
operator of retiree housing. Id
Expert testimony has never been required in business cases involving economic
issues. For example, in Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984), the plaintiff
claimed that a fire destroyed some it its equipment and caused it to lose profitable contracts.
Plaintiffs evidence supporting its lost profit claim was the testimony of an employee about
the jobs they lost and the value of those contracts. The trial court granted a directed verdict
for the defendant, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding the testimony of the
employee was sufficient to place the lost profits issue before the jury.
Plaintiffs' evidence on causation consists of showing the severe drop in attendance,
sales and other indicators that occurred direcdy after the Payson theater opened. A jury can
surely understand these facts. Deseret is welcome to attack this evidence in any way it
chooses, even through expert testimony, but there is no basis for finding that causation can
only be proven with expert testimony. The finding that expert testimony is required would
appear to be another reflection of the trial court's view that plaintiffs' numerical evidence is
insufficient. The trial court thought that the only way to prove causation would be to have
an expert in the movie business perform some comprehensive (and expensive) analysis on
the overall market place, and through this analysis rule out every other possible cause of the
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cause of the demise of plaintiffs' theater. While such evidence is certainly possible, there is
no legal basis for requiring such evidence.
B.

The Payson Theater Would Never Have
Opened Without Deseret's Assistance.

The trial court held, in the alternative, that even if the Payson theater's opening
caused the demise of plaintiffs' theater, Deseret's actions in obtaining financing for the
Payson theater were too remotely related to the failure of plaintiffs' theater to be deemed the
cause. (Add 27,28) This finding is based on both incorrect legal and factual assumptions.
Factually, there are two undisputed facts that show the necessary link. First, the
Payson theater would not have opened without an SBA-backed loan. This fact is
indisputable because the SBA cannot provide assistance unless no other financing is
available. 13 C.F.R. § 120.101.
Second, at the relevant time, Deseret was the only company providing assistance in
obtaining SBA-backed loans in Utah. (Rec 000459) Thus, the jury can find that the Payson
theater would never have opened without Deseret's assistance.
Plaintiffs need to prove that the loan was a "proximate cause" of their loss:
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence[ ]
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without which
the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one that necessarily
sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury, [citation omitted] "(T]he
issue of proximate cause should be taken from the jury only where: (1) there is no
evidence to establish a causal connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation,
or (2) where reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived
from the evidence on proximate causation."
Rase v. Prow City, 67 P.3d 1017,1024-25 (Utah App. 2000).
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Under this standard, plaintiffs must present evidence from which a jury could
conclude that the loan "set in operation" events that caused plaintiffs' injury. The loan,
which only Deseret could secure, meets this test.
The trial court also ruled that factors such as "market forces, business judgment and
quality of movies" were "efficient intervening causes." (Add 28) The trial court seemed to
be ruling that, even if the loan was a proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries, other factors such
as market conditions or management ability were intervening causes that broke the line of
causation. This, however, was pure speculation. N o evidence was presented that these
other factors played any role in the demise of plaintiffs' theater. The trial court therefore
found that plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of fact on causation because they did not rule out
all other possible causes of their injuries. There is no legal basis for such a burden.
The burden on a defendant arguing that there is an intervening cause is considerable.
In Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein (^Yielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App. 1996), for example, the
plaintiff sued a law firm for breach of fiduciary duty, claiming that if the firm had acted
appropriately, the plaintiff would have gotten different financing, which would have caused a
business transaction to turn out much more favorably. The trial court entered summary
judgment holding in part that the plaintiff had used a lawyer other than the defendant, and
that the advice of that other lawyer was an intervening cause. The appellate court reversed,
ruling that issue should have been resolved at trial.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute but that plaintiffs' business declined
immediately after the Payson theater opened. The trial court found that this decline was due
to some other intervening cause as a matter of law, even though no evidence of any other
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cause was presented. The question of whether there was an intervening cause should have
been left for trial, and could not properly provide a basis for summary judgment
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this brief, plaintiffs-appellants respectfully request that the
Court reverse the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the Count I
breach of fiduciary duty claim, the Count II intentional interference with prospective
economic relations claim and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and
remand the case for trial on those claims.
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ADDENDUM

FILED
Fourth JudlciaJ Distnci Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JON and ELIZABETH TRTESAULT,
RAYMON and STEPHANIE BORI
individuals, IMAGINATION THEATERS,
INC , a corporation, and IMAGINATION
THEATERS HOLDING, L L C a limited
liability company,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

RULING
Case #020401399
Judge Fred D Howard
Division 5

THE GREATER SALT LAKE BUSINESS
DISTRICT, a Utah corporation, doing
business as DESERET CDC,
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court regarding Defendant's Motionfor Summary Judgment
and Defendant' ^Motionfor Summary Judgment (Causation; Emotional Distress). The Court, having
reviewed the parties' respective pleadings and beingfollyadvised in the premises, hereby issues the
following:
RULING
BACKGROUND
This case arises from the involvement of the Defendants, a certified development
company (CDC), and the duty, if any, such company owes to small businesses that it assists in
obtaining federally guaranteed loans through the 504 SBA loan program Plaintiffs obtained an
SBA loan with Defendant's assistance in 1998 in order to build a movie theater in Spanish Fork,
Utah, named Spanish 8 Theater, Subsequently, Defendant aided another business, Payson

Theater, in obtaining an SBA loan which enabled it to construct a competing movie theater in
Payson, Utah Plaintiffs' business subsequently failed, which failui e Plaintiffs attribute to
competition from Payson Theater Plaintiffs sued Defendant alleging (1) breach of fiduciary duty,
(2) intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and (3) violation of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing Plaintiffs also allege intentional infliction of emotional
distress as part of each cause of action The Defendant has denied ary wrongdoing, claiming that
it owed no fiduciary duty toward Plaintiff and did not commit the alleged torts.
The Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on December 31, 2002 contending
that it owed no fiduciary duty toward Plaintiffs and, therefore, could not breach such a duty.
Defendant also asserted that it could not have interfered with Plaintiffs5 economic relations as a
matter of law because there were no facts to establish either an improper purpose or improper
means necessary to establish such a tort. The Defendant also argued that it did not violate the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because each party received what it bargained for in the
loan contract negotiations. The Plaintiffs responded alleging that Defendant was Plaintiffs' agent
and owed a corresponding duty because of that agency and that Defendant's actions constituted a
special relationship, by which it owed a duty implied by law. Plaintiffs also argued that the grant
of the loan to Payson Theater without informing the SBA of its potential harmful effect upon
Plaintiffs' business constituted an intentional interference with Plaintiffs' economic relations and
was in violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
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On June 17, 2003 Judge Claudia Laycock heard oral arguments on Defendant's motion
for summary judgment, which motion she denied, rulmg that factual issues existed that precluded
summary judgment. On January 1, 2004 Judge Fred Howard rotated into the fifth division and
assumed assignment over the present case The Defendant subsequently filed a second motion for
summary judgment on causation and emotional distress which w7as heard by the Court on April
13, 2004. The Court denied summary judgment on the issue of causation and granted summary
judgment on the claim for emotional distress, but subsequently reversed it's ruling on emotional
distress and denied summary judgment on that issue as well
The case was set for trial but upon review of Defendant's trial memorandum the Court
informed the parties that it wished to revisit all of the issues previously raised in the preceding
summary judgment motions. The Court vacated the previous rulings and invited the parties to
supplement their briefing on the issues, which the parties declined instead choosing to rest upon
their earlier submitted pleadings. The trial date was then stricken and oral arguments were
presented to the Court on June 8, 2004, whereupon the Court took the matter under advisement.
With respect to the standard governing summary judgment, the Court notes that
summary judgment is appropriate "only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Butterfieldv. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101
(Utah 1992). The Utah Supreme Court has stressed that the rules regarding summary judgment
"should be liberally interpreted to effectuate their purpose, to effect the prompt administration of
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justice, and to expedite litigation by avoiding needless trials where no triable issue of fact is
disclosed " Nat 'I American Life Ins. Co. v. Bayou Country Club, Ire, 403 P.2d 26, 29 (Utah
1965) Further, the purpose of a motion for summary judgment "is to provide a means of
searching out the undisputed facts" to determine if the matter can be resolved "as a matter of
law," thereby saving both the court and the parties the "time, trouble, and expense of a trial." Rich
v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266, 1267-68 (Utah 1976).
FIDUCIARY DUTY
Before this case may be presented to the jury on the question of any breach of duty, this
Court must determine whether, in light of the relevant facts, the Defendant owed a duty to the
Plaintiff. It is the province of the Court to determine as a matter of law the nature and extent, if
any, of the duty Defendant owed to Plaintiffs. Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah
1986); Hale v. Beckstead, 74 P.3d 628 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light,
969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998). Utah appellate courts have established two types of fiduciary
relationships. Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court recognized those relationships that are:
(1) created by contract such as principal and agent, attorney and client, and trustee and
cestui que trust, for example, and those created by formal legal proceedings such as
guardian and/or conservator and ward, and executor or administrator of an estate,
among others and (2) those implied in law due to the factual situation surrounding the
involved transactions and the relationship of the parties to each other and to the
questioned transactions.
First Sec. Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banberry Development Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1332 (Utah 1990).
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In this case, Plaintiffs have advanced two theories to establish a fiduciary duty First,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant was Plaintiffs3 agent, and as such, owed a fiduciary duty of
'loyalty' to Plaintiffs not to do anything that might harm their business Alternatively, Plaintiffs
argue that the relationship between the parties, including Defendant's advice and counsel to
Plaintiffs, created a relationship by which Defendant became an implied in law fiduciary to
Plaintiffs. The Court will consider each theory in turn.
A.

Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the elements of 'agency5 to support
their assertion that Defendant acted as Plaintiffs' agent.

The Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant was their agent in the procurement of an SB A
504 loan and giving offinancialand business advice to Plaintiffs after the loan and, therefore,
owed afiduciaryduty to Plaintiffs under a theory of agency Defendant defends that it was never
an agent for Plaintiffs. Among other things, Defendant refers the Court to the SBA's standard
operating procedure, which specifically states, "neither the development company nor its
employees is an agent for a 504 loan application in which the CDC is involved." SOP-10(4)(E)
Subpart A, chapter 6, 13 Regulations Regarding Agents(d). The SBA's standard operating
procedure, while possessing the air of authority, is neither a congressional nor administrative
regulation. As such, it is merely the SBA's interpretation of the relationship between a CDC and
prospective borrower and has no real authority upon the parties or the courts. Therefore, the
Court must look to the parties, their relationship, and general agency principles to determine if an
agency relationship existed.
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In order to establish that Defendant acted as Plaintiffs' agent, Plaintiffs must
demonstrate that their relationship satisfies basic agency principles The Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 1 (1958) defines agency as uthe fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation
of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and consent by the other so to act." See also Mecham v. Consolidated Oil &
Transportation, Inc., 53 P.3d 479, 483 (Utah Ct App. 2002) ("agency is 'the fiduciary relation
which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to anc ther that the other shall act
on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act'5') (quoting Wardley
Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)); Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah,
970 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1998) (a[t]o be an agent, a person must be authorized by another to
'act on his behalf and subject to his control5") (quoting Restatement ^Second) of Agency § 1
(1958)).
The Plaintiffs have produced evidence demonstrating that they authorized Defendant to
act on their behalf in obtaining an SB A loan. Plaintiffs were SB A loan applicants who relied upon
Defendant to assist them in preparing their application materials and were required to work with
and to conform to Defendant's requirements in order to obtain SB A approval. The Plaintiffs
placed their trust and confidence in Defendant, who was their voice with the SB A, and without
Defendant's assistance, Plaintiffs likely would not have obtained the SB A loan.

Page 6 of

30

Plaintiffs have not, however, presented any evidence that Defendant was subject to
Plaintiffs' control, nor that Defendant consented to be under Plaintiffs' control. To the contrary,
Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Defendant directed Plaintiffs as to how to prepare their
SBA loan application and have alleged that Defendant directed Plaintiffs on how to conduct their
business Nowhere in their pleadings do Plaintiffs submit evidence that Defendant was subject to
Plaintiffs' control. Rather, the Plaintiffs have repeatedly emphasized the direction and control
Defendant allegedly had over Plaintiffs. This element of agency law is not simply to be glossed
over. "It is the element of continuous subjection to the will of the principal which distinguishes the
agent from other fiduciaries and the agency agreement from other agreements." Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 1 cmt. b (1958).
Plaintiffs refer to 13 C.F.R.§ 103.1(a) and (b) (1996) in support of their assertion that
Defendant was Plaintiffs' agent. This regulation defines an agent as:
... an authorized representative, including an attorney, accountant, consultant,
packager, lender service provider, or any other person representing an applicant or
participant by conducting business with SBA.
(b) The term conduct business with SBA means:
(1) Preparing or submitting on behalf of an applicant an application for financial
assistance of any kind...
Plaintiffs contend the above regulation establishes Defendant as Plaintiffs5 agent.
Plaintiffs are in error. This regulation simply defines what it means to be an agent, but does not
establish Defendant as Plaintiffs' agent, nor does it obviate the need for traditional agency law
analysis. If Plaintiffs had hired an attorney, accountant, consultant, etc. to represent them in their
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dealings with the SBA, this regulation would establish that individual as an agent who could do
business with the SBA This regulation does not, however, confirm agency status upon Defendant
simply because Defendant assisted Plaintiffs in preparing theii loan application Further, the
SBA's interpretation of this regulation, while not binding, is certainly illustrative of the intent
behind this regulation See SOP-10(4)(E) Subpart A, chapter 6, 13 Regulations Regarding
Agents(d), "neither the development company nor its employees is an agent for a 504 loan
application in which the CDC is involved "
A certified development company is required by the SBA to assist loan applicants to
ensure that the applicants meet certain qualifications in order to protect the SBA. Thus, the
relationship between the Defendant and Plaintiffs is more akin to that of an intermediary than that
of agent/principal, i e someone who wields power in the name of anDther but is not considered an
agent under agency law principles. The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 cmt. g (1958)
addresses such individuals "who bind others, or even act in the name of others, but do so for their
own purposes." The Restatement specifically refers to the relationship between a mortgagor and
mortgagee1 to illustrate this principle that a person may act in the name of another without
becoming an agent, and concluded that "[s]uch a power is not an agency power and the holder of
one is not an agent of the one who created it." Id Such is the case here Defendant was

1

The Utah Supreme Court has declared that the relationship
between mortgagor and mortgagee is presumptively "not of a
fiduciary character.1 First Sec. Bank of Utah at 1332.
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empowered to act in Plaintiffs' name in its communication with the SB A, but did so for its own
purpose - to foster economic growth in the community by assisting small businesses to obtain
SB A loans The Defendant possessed power to act on Plaintiffs' behalf in the facilitating and
servicing of the SB A loan, such as "collecting] money due on the contract," id, but was not
under the control of the Plaintiffs and, therefore, not an c agent' under a legal agency analysis
In conclusion, without some evidence from Plaintiffs that they did in fact exercise some
degree of control over Defendant and that Defendant consented to the control, this Court cannot
conclude that Defendant acted as Plaintiffs' agent. Accordingly, without an agency relationship,
Defendant did not owe Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty and could, therefore, assist Payson Theater in
obtaining an SB A loan.
B.

The limited scope and purpose of Defendant's agency, assuming such an
agency existed, prevented Defendant from having a fiduciary duty toward
Plaintiffs.

Even should the Plaintiffs be able to produce evidence that Plaintiffs exercised some
degree of control over Defendant sufficient to establish an agency relationship, the Court cannot
conclude that the relationship between the parties was a fiduciary relationship due to the fact that
"an agent is a fiduciary with respect to the matters within the scope of the agency" only. 3 Am.
Jur. 2d Agency § 205 (2004). In other words, "an agent is not in a fiduciary relationship to the
principal in matters in which the agent is not employed unless the nature of the agency is such as
to create a confidential relationship in all maters " Id. The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 390
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cmt. d (1958) states, an "agent is not, as such, in a fiduciary relation with the principal as to
matters in which he is not employed " See also BcmcoklahomaMorlg. Corp. v. Capital Title Co.^
194 F.3d 1089, 1104 (10th Cir.1999) ("agency is characterized by ... a fiduciary relationship with
respect to matters within the scope of the agency") (emphasis added), Taylor v. Hamden Hall
School, 182 A.2d 615, 618 (Conn. 1962) ("[h]e is not in a fiduciary relation to his principal,
however, in matters in which he is not employed1'). The facts of this case, even when considered
in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, demonstrate that Defendant, assuming an agency
relationship existed, was an agent for the limited purpose of obtaining and servicing the SB A loan
for Plaintiffs. Defendant was not a director or officer of Plaintiffs' business, did not possess
authority to bind Plaintiffs to contracts with third parties, did not share in the risks or rewards of
the theater, and was not directly compensated by Plaintiffs for any suggestions given to Plaintiffs.
Thus, the facts submitted by Plaintiffs clearly establish that, urder agency law, Defendant
did not have a confidential relationship in all matters, and as such, could only be considered an
agent for the limited purpose of obtaining and servicing the SB A loan. This limited duty cannot
reasonably be expanded to include a fiduciary duty of'loyalty' not to do anything that might harm
Plaintiffs' business interests. To accept Plaintiffs' argument would mean that anyone who
performs a service for another now has a duty to that individual or business entity similar to that
possessed by directors and officers of a corporation, only this duty would be imposed without
granting the rights and privileges that accompany directors and officers. Such logic would impose
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the rigorous responsibilities of directors and officers upon all agents, regardless of the agent's
authority within the business, without the corresponding rights and rewards Such a conclusion is
not warranted by the law or the facts of this case
In addition, once the loan was made, Defendant became Plaintiffs' lender via contract.
Contractually, Plaintiffs were obligated to Defendant to repay the loan. Should Plaintiffs default
on the loan, Defendant would be legally entitled to sue them for breach of contract. In short,
Defendant and Plaintiffs were arms-length parties to a contract, which by its nature, precluded
Defendant from having a duty of'loyalty' for Plaintiffs. Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915
P.2d 1060, 1064 (Utah 1996) ("when the parties deal'at arm's length' or in an adversarial
relationship, nofiduciaryrelationship can be said to exist") (emphasis added). It would be
inconsistent for Defendant to pursue its lawdnl remedy in court should Plaintiffs default and
simultaneously observe a duty of'loyalty' toward Plaintiffs. Therefore, under an agency law
analysis, Defendant did not possess a fiduciary duty as advocated by Plaintiffs, and could,
therefore, assist other businesses such as Payson Theater in obtaining an SBA loan.
C.

Defendant was not an implied in law fiduciary for Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs' second theory for imposing a duty upon Defendant is that Defendant became an
implied in law fiduciary "due to the factual situation surrounding the involved transactions and the
relationship of the parties to each other." First Sec. Bank o/Utah,786 P.2d at 1332. To become
an implied in law fiduciary several principles must be considered, namely (1) "A fiduciary
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relationship imparts a position of peculiar confidence placed by one individual in another," (2) a
"fiduciary is a person with a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another," (3) a "fiduciary is in
a position to have and exercise and does have and exercise influence over another; (4) a "fiduciary
relationship implies a condition of superiority of one of the parties o/er the other;" and (5)
generally speaking, "in a fiduciary relationship, the property, interest, or authority of the other is
placed in the charge of the fiduciary." Id. at 1333. In First Sec. Bank of Utah, the court also
noted that a confidential relationship may be estabhshed when one party places continuous trust in
the skill and integrity of another and that there exists "a certain inequality, dependence, weakness
of age, of mental strength, business intelligence, knowledge of the facts involved, or other
conditions, giving to one advantage over the other. Id.2
2

Plaintiffs cite several cases where different courts found various lending institutions to
have created a fiduciary duty with their respective borrowers through the actions of bank/lender
employees. However, while it is true that a fiduciary duty may arise between a lender and its
borrower through special factual circumstances, all of the cases cited by Plaintiffs are inapposite
to the case at hand. In all of the cited cases, the courts found that specific, special facts existed to
warrant finding that a special relationship and corresponding duty existed. For instance, in the
cases cited by Plaintiffs the courts find one of the following facts to be present: (1) the lender
claimed ownership in the borrower's property, (2) the lender had a financial interest in property
purchased by borrower, (3) the lender induced the borrower to sell and unfairly purchased the
borrower's property, (4) the lender made affirmative false representations and induced borrower
to purchase property the lender had afinancialinterest in, or (5) the lender knowingly assisted a
client in breaching the client's fiduciary duties the client owed to his former corporation as a
director of that corporation. Plaintiffs have not alleged any of these factual settings, and as such,
the Court observes that the facts of this case are distinguishable from the authorities cited by
Plaintiffs. SeeMancuso v. United Bank of Pueblo, 818 P.2d 732 (Cclo. 1991); Capital Bank v.
MVB Co., 644 So.2d 515 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1994), Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985);
Security Pacific National Bank v. Williams, 213 Cal. App. 3d 927 (Cal Ct. App. 1989);
Steelvest, Inc. v. ScansteelSendee Ctr. Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Kent. 1991).
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Applying the facts of this case to the law, it is clear that Defendant did not possess a
fiduciary relationship with the Plaintiffs In their pleadings, Plaintiffs place great emphasis on the
fact that Defendant advised and assisted Plaintiffs in procuring the SB A loan While it is true that
Defendant did have a responsibility to assist Plaintiffs in the loan application and approval
process, and for purposes of the motions, presumably possessed superior knowledge and skill to
advise Plaintiffs on how to obtain an SB A loan, the Defendant did in fact obtain the loan for the
Plaintiffs, thereby fulfilling its obligation Had the Defendant thereafter ceased to advise Plaintiffs,
there would be no question that a fiduciary relationship did not exist. Thus, the real issue concerns
the relationship between the parties in light of their history and the advice given to the Plaintiffs
post-loan.
The Plaintiffs recite facts in support of their assertion that Defendant owed Plaintiffs a
fiduciary duty. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Mr. Vanchiere, Defendant's employee,
visited the theater twice per month, advised Plaintiffs regarding the theater's operation including
what concessions to sell and what movies to show, was given confidential financial information
concerning the theater, and assisted the Plaintiffs in obtaining SBA approval to lease portions of
the theater's parking lot to a neighboring business. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p 14-15. Though Plaintiffs have also alleged that
Defendant "made sure plaintiffs never personally took any amount of money from the theater until
the theater became profitable/' they have failed to produce any evidence to demonstrate how
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Defendant amade sure " Id Absent such record, Plaintiffs have failed to establish such assertion as
a 'fact'
While it is clear from the facts that Plaintiffs trusted Defendant, taken together, these facts
cannot establish the requirements for a fiduciary as mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in First
Sec. Bank of Utah, 786 P.2d at 1332. First, the recited facts do not demonstrate that Defendant
had a duty to act primarily for the benefit of Plaintiffs, nor that the Defendant was ever placed in
charge of Plaintiffs5 property or interests. Defendant was not a partrer or party to a joint venture
business with the Plaintiffs, nor did Defendant share in the risks or rewards of the theater. In
addition, Defendant never possessed any authority to compel Plaintiffs to act on any of its
suggestions. There is no evidence suggesting that Defendant utilized any of the theater's
confidentialfinancialinformation for any purpose let alone to the Plaintiffs' detriment.3 Thus, the
fact that Defendant possessed confidential financial information is immaterial. Also, the fact that
Plaintiffs were later required to obtain SB A approval for the parking lot lease through Defendant
does not establish a fiduciary duty. The terms of the contract required Plaintiffs to obtain SB A
approval in order to ensure that the collateral for the SBA loan remained viable. Defendant was
simply acting in accordance with the contract in servicing the loan for the Plaintiffs. Defendant
3

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a bank did
not possess a fiduciary duty toward a client who divulged
confidential information to the bank when the bank loaned money
to the client's competibor knowing that the competitor would use
the money to purchase controlling stock in the client's
corporation. Washington
Steel,
Corp. v. TW Corp.,
602 F.2d 594
(3r* Cir. 1979) .
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was not engaging in behavior outside the contract that would give rise to a special relationship
and corresponding duty
Simply put, all of the facts of this case considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs
demonstrate that Plaintiffs were not dependent on the Defendant in the operation of their
business, nor were the Plaintiffs inferior to Defendant in weakness of age, mental strength,
business intelligence, or knowledge, that would give Defendant an advantage over the Plaintiffs.
Any arguable duty possessed by Defendant was created by its behavior, and is, therefore, also
limited by that behavior. If Defendant possessed any duty beyond obtaining an SBA loan for
Plaintiffs, it was a duty to continue to give advice to the best of its knowledge concerning the
operation of the theater. Plaintiffs argue that by virtue of the parties' relationship, Defendant had a
duty of'loyalty' to Plaintiffs not to do anything that would injure Plaintiffs' business, or a duty
similar to that possessed by directors and officers of a corporation. The Court cannot conclude
that such a duty was created by Defendant's limited actions. Defendant was not a director,
officer, or owner of Plaintiffs' business, did not share in the risks or rewards of the business, and
possessed no authority to compel the Plaintiffs to follow any of its suggestions. In short,
Defendant was simply a facilitator for obtaining an SBA loan whose employee, Mr. Vanchiere,
developed an amicable relationship with Plaintiffs and who gave gratuitous advice, if not mere
suggestions, to Plaintiffs after the SBA loan was obtained. Such behavior by Defendant cannot as
a matter of law confer a fiduciary duty upon Defendant.
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D.

Public policy disfavors conferring fiduciary duties upon lenders.

In addition to the proceeding, public policy strongly opposes conferring any such duty
The policy of the United States government favors competition "Only through full and free
competition can free markets, free entry into business and opportunities for the expression and
growth of personal initiative and individual judgment be assured." 15 U.S C.S. § 631(a) (1997).
The purpose of a certified development company, (CDC), is to develop communities by assisting
small businesses in obtaining capital loans The logic advanced by Plaintiffs would preclude a
CDC from loaning money to any business that might compete with an existing business that
previously obtained SBA funding through the CDC. Such logic is inapposite to the concept of
free markets and commercial competition, and would essentially eviscerate a CDC's ability to
provide funding.
If Plaintiffs5 argument were accepted, any business could limit, if not eliminate,
competition simply by obtaining a loan before its competitors. Lenders would be limited in
funding types of businesses. Arguments over the "type of business," its scope and breadth, would
inevitably arise and burden lenders to assess if a potential loan was an inappropriate aid to a
competitor. For example, would Defendant be precluded from lending to a candy store near
Plaintiffs' theater since Plaintiffs sell candy at the theater and a large percentage of Plaintiffs'
revenue comes from concession sales? Would lending to a video rental store, cable, or satellite
industry, which are presumably businesses competitive to a theater, be prohibited?
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Plaintiffs' competition argument creates a host of problems concerning the availability of
funding and economic development that would undoubtedly hinder rather than foster the growth
of business While it may be true that competition may cause some of the businesses to which
SBA has loaned funds to go out of business, it is the province of Congress to determine the
regulations and procedures by which such funding shall be available
For these reasons, and for those set forth in Defendant's memoranda, this Court concludes
the Defendant owed no fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs that would prevent Defendant from giving a
loan to any business that competed with Plaintiffs Specifically, the Court finds as a matter of law
that Defendant did not possess a fiduciary duty toward Plaintiffs that prevented Defendant from
giving a loan to Payson Theater and, accordingly, dismisses Plaintiffs5 first cause of action
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS
In order to recover for common-law tort of intentional interference with prospective
economic relations, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the
plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper
means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. ISOM, 657 P,2d
293, 304 (Utah 1982)
The Plaintiffs contend the first element of interference with economic relations is satisfied
by the fact that Defendant facilitated the SBA loan for Payson Theater when it 'knew5 such loan
would destroy Plaintiffs' business The Court declines to address this issue of whether Defendant
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intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs' business, instead finding that the analysis on the second
and third elements of economic interference to be dispositive
Plaintiffs rest their argument for the second element of interference with economic
relations upon 'improper means,5 which may be established by showing 'Violence, threats or
intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigatisn, defamation, or disparaging
falsehood." Id. at 308 Specifically, Plaintiffs allege Defendant committed deceit or
misrepresentation by failing to inform the SBA of the alleged harmful effect the Payson Theater
competition could have upon Plaintiffs' business where the Plaintiffs' business was also funded by
the SBA Improper means may also be established through a violation of "an established standard
of a trade or profession," id., which Plaintiffs contend occurred when Defendant allegedly
violated a federal regulation prohibiting a "conflict of interest with a small business with which it
is dealing." 13 C.F.R. § 120.140(b) (2003).
Plaintiffs contend that deceit or misrepresentation is demons:rated by the fact that
Defendant, for "pure profit," assisted the Payson Theater in obtaining an SBA loan without
informing the SBA of the 'fact' that the loan to Payson Theater would result in the "destruction of
plaintiffs' business," which was funded by the SBA. Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment p. 29-30. Plaintiffs argue the SBA did not know that
Payson Theater would compete with and possibly drive Plaintiffs' theater out of business and that
the SBA would not have authorized the Payson Theater loan had it been advised of such facts.
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There aie several flaws to Plaintiffs' argument First, Plaintiffs have produced no evidence
supporting their assertion that Defendant loaned money to Payson Theater because of a profit
motive Plaintiffs have simply assumed that because Defendant would receive no fee from the
SB A if the loan to Payson Theater was not approved that Defendant must have been operating
with a self-interested motive The Court notes that the Defendant is a non-profit organization and
Plaintiffs have failed to produce affidavits or other record showing a profit motive, such as
Defendant needing fees to continue its operation, or of an employee, such as Mr Vanchiere,
requiring such fees to maintain his employment
More importantly, the Plaintiffs have failed to frame the non-disclosure of the alleged
effect of the Payson Theater loan on Plaintiffs in terms of SBA knowledge Plaintiffs assume that
the SBA was unaware that arguably the Payson Theater's business plan would take 'market share'
of theater patrons from Plaintiffs' theater, thereby reducing revenues and potentially cause
Plaintiffs to default on their loan obligations Plaintiffs contend that such non-disclosure
constitutes 'deceit or misrepresentation5 and was, therefore, an improper means However, the
only record produced by Plaintiffs in support of this allegation is an appraisal that states the
Payson Theater should succeed despite the fact that there are several theaters in the area because
the Payson Theater will be new and, therefore, will likely attract more than its 'fair share5 of the
market and make the older theaters "no longer feasible ,5 Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit G, A Complete Appraisal, p 31 The
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appraisal does specifically mention Plaintiffs' business, Spanish 8 Theater, but not the fact that
Spanish 8 Theater was funded by an SB A loan Id
Deceit is defined as "the act or practice of deceiving as by falsification, concealment, or
cheating " Webster's Third'New International Dictionary (1993) To show these elements,
Plaintiffs must produce some evidence that the Defendant falsified or concealed information from
the SBA or somehow cheated the SBA Plaintiffs have produced nc such evidence to support
such an assertion of deceit There is no record by an appropriate SEA agent stating that it was
unaware of the competing nature of the loans and that the SBA would not have awarded the
Payson Theater loan with such knowledge. The SBA might have been aware of both loans and
the competing nature of those loans or the SBA may have been unpersuaded by the appraisal's
claim that Payson Theater would drive other theaters out of business The record is silent as to
whether the SBA was ignorant of those facts Plaintiffs contend were undisclosed The only Tact5
before the Court is the above mentioned appraisal, which, by itself, is insufficient to establish an
allegation of deceit There is not, therefore, a material fact in dispute over whether the SBA was
deceived since the facts before this Court, which are not disputed, cannot establish the elements of
deceit or misrepresentation.
Regarding Plaintiffs' contention that Defendant violated an established standard of a trade
or profession, such arguments also fail The Plaintiffs present no evidence to support this assertion
other than the fact that Defendant assisted Payson Theater in obtaining SBA financing Plaintiffs
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argue with emphasis thai this fact alone demonstrates a violation because the competing loan was
in conflict with Plaintiffs' interests and federal regulations prohibit a CDC from having a "conflict
of interest with a small business with which it is dealing " 13 C.F.R § 120 140(b) (2003).
Plaintiffs interpret this regulation as meaning a CDC cannot grant a loan to any business that may
compete with a business that has already obtained SBA financing. However, the regulation
contains no such language It simply prohibits conflicts of interest but does not define what
constitutes a conflict of interest Again, public policy cuts against Plaintiffs' argument that
Defendant has a conflict of interest when it assists competing businesses to obtain loans because
competition fosters development, and the very purpose for Defendant's existence is to develop
communities by assisting small businesses in obtaining loans. Having no fiduciary duty, or at the
minimum a clearly defined regulation barring the granting of competing loans, it cannot be said
that Defendant had a conflict of interest when it assisted Payson Theater in obtaining SBA
financing.
In addition, Plaintiffs cannot meet the third element of interference with economic
relations: causation. The Plaintiffs have assumed that the Defendant's loan to Payson Theater
caused Plaintiffs' business to fail. However, while Plaintiffs make many assertions that said loan
caused their business to fail, the Court disagrees with such arguments. The Plaintiffs have not
produced sufficient evidentiary facts to allow a jury to conclude, without speculation, that the
giving of the loan to Payson Theater caused Plaintiffs' business to fail. As will be discussed under
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the causation section of this Ruling, Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, cannot establish that the
Defendant caused Plaintiffs' business to fail by assisting Payson Theater in obtaining an SB A loan
In conclusion, the facts as recited by Plaintiffs do not support an act of deceit or
misrepresentation or a violation of an established standard of a trade or profession sufficient to
defeat summary judgment Also, Plaintiffs cannot as a matter of law meet the third element
required to establish economic interference, which is to demonstrate that Defendant's actions
caused Plaintiffs' injury For these reasons, the Court concludes as a matter of law that Defendant
did not intentionally interfere with Plaintiffs' prospective economic relations and, therefore,
dismisses Plaintiffs' second cause of action.
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing entitles each party to a contract the right to
enjoy the benefits of the contract. St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811
P 2d 194 (Utah 1991). "To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a
party's actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations
of the other party ... [t]he purpose, intentions, and expectations of the parties should be
determined by considering the contract language and the course of dealings between and conduct
of the parties." itf at 200.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing under
the contract by granting a loan to a competitor, thereby undermining Plaintiffs' business The
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Plaintiffs have again failed to marshal sufficient evidentiary facts to defeat summary judgment
Plaintiffs have failed to show any evidence that Defendant violated Plaintiffs' reasonable
expectations to enjoy the fruits of the contract Plaintiffs contend there is a disputed material fact
by virtue of Defendant allegedly violating Plaintiffs' reasonable expectation "that they would be
able to pay off the loan without DCDC affirmatively sabotaging their business " Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment \> 32 Defendant
does not dispute that Plaintiff did in fact possess such a reasonable expectation, however, the
Court concludes that Plaintiffs' recited facts do not support the assertion that Defendant did in
fact sabotage Plaintiffs' business Again, Plaintiffs rely upon the argument that Defendant's
assistance to Payson Theater is evidence per se of Defendant damaging Plaintiffs' business
Plaintiffs' assumption and subsequent arguments are unsupported by the facts or law, however
The Court has previously discussed the fact that Defendant did not possess a fiduciary
duty toward Plaintiffs and that public policy favors competition The Plaintiffs contracted with
Defendant for Defendant to provide SB A financing and subsequent servicing of the loan, which
Defendant accomplished, and the Plaintiffs agreed to pay back the loan. The parties never
contracted for a prohibition by Defendant never to give competing loans during the life of the
Plaintiffs' loan It is unreasonable for Plaintiffs to expect that Defendant would never give loans to
competing businesses Further, a party may not acquire via a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing that which he could not obtain through contract negotiation Noting the Court's previous
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analysis, Plaintiffs have failed to establish facts which show7 that Defendant did anything to violate
Plaintiffs' justified expectations Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Plaintiffs' third cause of
action for the violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
CAUSATION
In order for the Plaintiffs to prevail upon their claims against Defendant, Plaintiffs must
show that Defendant's actions were the proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries Proximate
causation is defined as, '"that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred "" Butter field v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992) (quoting Mitchell v. Pearson,
697 P 2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985)). Ordinarily, proximate cause should be submitted to the jury.
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983). However, "notwithstanding the
general rule, it is also true that summary judgment may be granted on proximate cause in
appropriate circumstances." Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund of Utah, 83 P.3d 391, 395 (Utah
Ct App 2003) Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no evidence that establishes a
direct causal connection between [defendant's] alleged negligence and the injury," and where the
plaintiff cannot "show that a jury could conclude, without speculation," that the injury would not
have occurred but for the defendant's breach Id See also Harhne v. Baker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah
1996) ("Issues regarding proximate cause can be decided as a matter of law

when the

proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation so that the claim fails as a matter of law");
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Sumison v. Streator-Smith, Inc , 132 P 2d 680, 683 (Utah 1943) (summary judgment is
appropriate because "where the proximate cause of the injur}' is left to conjecture, the plaintiff
must fail as a matter of law")
A.

Plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence that would allow a jury to conclude,
without speculation, that Payson Theater caused Plaintiffs5 business to fail.

Utah Courts have consistently held that juries are not "free to find a causal connection
between a breach and some subsequent injury by relying on unsupported speculation " Mahmood
v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933, 938 (Utah 1999). Expert testimony is required to establish causation
unless "the propriety of the defendant's action 'is within the common knowledge and experience
of the layman '" Shreiterv. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P 2d 570, 574 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(quoting Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980)). Expert testimony is particularly
needed "where the average person has little understanding of the duties owed by particular trades
or professions, as in cases involving medical doctors, architects, and engineers." Id. at 574. "The
need for positive expert testimony to establish a causal link between the defendant's negligent act
and the plaintiffs injury depends upon the nature of the injury." Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 12 P,3d
1015, 1019 (Utah 2000) (citingRiggins v. BechtelPower Corp., 722 P.2d 819, 824 (Wash Ct.
App 1986)).
The case before this Court involves complex commercial matters regarding the factors
involved in a movie theater's success or failure, including the theater's feasibility, competency of
theater's directors, patrons' preferences, location of theater, choice of movies and concessions,
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profit-loss of the theater, competition, market conditions, and the economy as a whole These are
matters that are certainly not within the ''common knowledge and experience of the layman "
Shreiier^ll P 2d at 574 The Plaintiffs have offered little evidence of causation other than
Plaintiffs' own beliefs that Payson Theater drove them out of busiress Plaintiffs have failed to
offer an expert who could assist the jury in determining causation without impermissible
speculation The causal evidence Plaintiffs have tendered include the attendance numbers at
Plaintiffs' theater before and after Payson Theater opened, a comparison of Star Wars movies,
and a market analysis appraisal for the Payson Theater's feasibility See Plaintiffs' Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendant }s Second Motion for Summary Judgment.
This evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Payson Theater caused Plaintiffs5 business
to fail The Plaintiffs have failed to address many issues of causation including consumer taste,
business judgment in the operation of the theaters, and market factors, such as general economic
conditions that may affect movie-goers and the opening of the Provo Towne Centre movie
theaters to name just a few The Plaintiffs seem fixated on the above mentioned appraisal and
believe that it demonstrates causation However, the appraisal does not address the need for
competent directors to operate the Payson Theater and the possibility of its failure due to poor
business judgment One appraisal commenting on the feasibility of Payson Theater is insufficient
to establish causation, especially when that appraisal does not address the myriad of factors that
comprise a successful business In short, the possible reasons a business may fail are many and
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complex and a jury would require expert assistance in maldng such a determination The Plaintiffs
have failed to provide any expert testimony, instead relying upon conjecture to sustain their
causative argument From the evidence before the Court, it is clear that no reasonable juror could
conclude, without speculation, that the Payson Theater caused Plaintiffs' business to fail4
B.

Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence that Defendant's grant of the loan to
Payson Theater caused Plaintiffs5 business to fail.

Not only must the Plaintiffs prove that Payson Theater caused Plaintiffs' theater to fail,
Plaintiffs must establish the fact that because Defendant assisted Payson Theater in obtaining an
SBA loan this caused Plaintiffs' business to fail In other words, Plaintiffs must provide evidence
establishing a direct causal link that shows the giving of the loan to Payson Theater caused
Plaintiffs' theater to fail. Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to support such a burden of proof in
order to avoid summary judgment.
In the Court's view, the grant of the Payson Theater loan is a step removed from the
competition between the two theaters. It cannot be said that the grant of the loan to Payson
Theater would result in a successful operation and profitability of the Payson Theater since,
ultimately, its success and profitability were dependent upon the independent exercise of good
business judgment by its owners and managers. Inasmuch as the mere grant of the loan did not

4

Plaintiffs are obligated to produce sufficient facts to
defeat summary judgment in their opposition memorandum.
Plaintiffs may not rely upon statements in oral argument that
they will produce sufficient facts at trial, and thereby defeat
summary judgment.
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guarantee Payson Theaters' success, it cannot be said that the loan to Payson Theater caused
Plaintiffs' injury To illustrate, if Payson Theater were operated by incompetent business people
and ultimately failed due to the exercise of poor business judgment Plaintiffs would still be in
business regardless of the fact that Defendant obtained an SB A loan for Payson Theater
The grant of a loan to Payson Theater is not the cause of its success or Plaintiffs' failure,
but such success or failure is the product and result of the operation of a business by the exercise
of good business judgment under favorable market and economic conditions The many factors
that comprise business success such as market forces, business judgment, quality of movies,
location, etc are "efficient intervening cause[s]" that effectively eliminate the proximate cause
connection. Butterfield, 831 P.2d at 106
In conclusion, it is clear that the Plaintiffs have failed to produce sufficient evidence to
defeat summary judgment The Plaintiffs have failed to produce adequate evidence establishing a
direct causal link that would enable a jury to conclude, without speculation, that (1) Payson
Theater did in fact cause Plaintiffs' business to fail, and (2) that Defendant's grant of the SB A
loan to Payson Theater caused Plaintiffs' theater to fail In order for a jury to make such a causal
determination, the jury would require expert testimony to assist it due to the complex nature of
the economic circumstances, which the Plaintiffs have failed to provide Taken together, this
Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to produce sufficient evidence regarding causation to
allow this issue to go before a jury Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs' Complaint, and all
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respective causes of action, based upon the lack of causation between Defendant's alleged
conduct and Plaintiffs' injury
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Defendant was not Plaintiffs' agent and
did not owe Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty The Court further finds that Plaintiffs have failed to
produce sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on both their intentional interference
with prospective economic relations and violation of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing causes of action The Court also finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to produce adequate
evidence to allow the issue of causation to go before a jury Accordingly, and respectfully, the
Court dismisses Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice and all respective causes of action along with
the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims Plaintiffs attached to each cause of action.
Counsel for Defendant is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this Ruling.

Dated this ^L/

"clay of July 2004
s*.

BY THE COURT-

JUDGE F R E D y HOWARD,1 ^
/District Court/Judge
'-^
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